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Candidate Stability and Voting Corespondences

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  • Rodriguez-Alvarez, Carmelo

Abstract

We study the incentives of candidates to enter or to exit elections in order to strategically affect the outcome of a voting correspondence. We extend the results of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (2000), who only considered single-valued voting procedures by admitting that the outcomes of voting may consist of sets of candidates. We show that, if candidates form their preferences over sets according to Expected Utility Theory and Bayesian updating, every unanimous and non dictatorial voting correspondence violates candidate stability. When candidates are restricted to use even chance prior distributions, only dictatorial or bidictatorial rules are unanimous and candidate stable. We also analyze the implications of using other extension criteria to define candidate stability that open the door to positive results.
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Suggested Citation

  • Rodriguez-Alvarez, Carmelo, "undated". "Candidate Stability and Voting Corespondences," Economic Research Papers 269479, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:uwarer:269479
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269479
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Kentaro Hatsumi, 2009. "Candidate Stable Voting Rules for Separable Orderings," ISER Discussion Paper 0735, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
    3. Bhaskar Dutta & Matthew O. Jackson & Michel Le Breton, 2004. "Equilibrium agenda formation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(1), pages 21-57, August.
    4. Berga, Dolors & Bergantinos, Gustavo & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2007. "An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 152-175, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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