The scoring rules in an endogenous election
Plurality rule, when applied to a fixed agenda setting, is mostly criticized from being capable of choosing an alternative considered as worst by a strict majority. In this paper we consider an endogenous agenda setting with no more than three alternatives. In those equilibria where the Condorcet winner enters the contest, we show, in direct contrast to the fixed agenda case, that Plurality rule is the only scoring rule which always elects the Condorcet winner.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Volume (Year): 25 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
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