Plurality Rule Works in Three-Candidate Elections
In the citizen-candidate approach each citizen chooses whether or not to run as candidate. In this paper we find that the strategic entry-exit decision of the candidates eliminates one of the most undesirable properties of Plurality rule, namely to elect a poor candidate in three-candidate elections since as we show, the Condorcet winner among the self-declared candidates is always elected. All the equilibrium configurations where up to three candidates enter the race are described. We additionally find that it is in those equilibria where four or more citizens become candidate that the Condorcet loser among the self-declared candidates can be elected.
|Date of creation:||2003|
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