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Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative Vote Rule

Author

Listed:
  • Arnaud Dellis

    (Universite Laval and CIRPEE)

  • Mandar Oak

    () (School of Economics, University of Adelaide)

  • Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile

    (Universite Laval and CIRPEE)

Abstract

We use the citizen-candidate model to study electoral outcomes under the Alternative Vote rule, a voting method often proposed as a replacement to the prevalent Plurality rule. We show that, like the Plurality rule, the Alternative Vote rule deters multiple candidate clusters and the presence of candidates at more than two positions. Moreover, the Alternative Vote rule tends to support less policy polarization than the Plurality rule. These results stand in contrast to those obtained under other proposed voting rules, Approval Voting in particular, which are prone to candidate clustering and, as a result, can support greater policy polarization vis-Ã -vis the Plurality rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak & Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile, 2015. "Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative Vote Rule," School of Economics Working Papers 2015-06, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:adl:wpaper:2015-06
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    File URL: http://www.economics.adelaide.edu.au/research/papers/doc/wp2015-06.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Osborne Martin J., 1993. "Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 133-151, January.
    2. Forsythe, Robert & Rietz, Thomas & Myerson, Roger & Weber, Robert, 1996. "An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three-Candidate Elections," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(3), pages 355-383.
    3. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 1-38, January.
    4. Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O & Le Breton, Michel, 2001. "Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1013-1037, July.
    5. Karine Van der Straeten & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & André Blais, 2010. "Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(3), pages 435-472, September.
    6. Dellis, Arnaud, 2009. "Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 772-801, March.
    7. Dellis, Arnaud & Oak, Mandar P., 2006. "Approval voting with endogenous candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 47-76, January.
    8. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
    9. repec:cup:apsrev:v:76:y:1982:i:04:p:753-766_18 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Massimo Morelli, 2004. "Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(3), pages 829-853.
    11. Sandro Brusco & Jaideep Roy, 2011. "Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(1), pages 83-104, January.
    12. Jon Eguia, 2007. "Citizen candidates under uncertainty," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(2), pages 317-331, September.
    13. Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinski, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96.
    14. Shlomo Weber, 1992. "On Hierarchical Spatial Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(2), pages 407-425.
    15. Steven Callander, 2005. "Electoral Competition in Heterogeneous Districts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 1116-1145, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar oak, 2015. "Endogenous Candidacy in Electoral Competition: A Survey," School of Economics Working Papers 2015-19, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
    2. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," School of Economics Working Papers 2016-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
    3. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 1-38, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Alternative Vote rule; Instant Runoff Voting; Citizen-candidate model; Endogenous candidacy; policy polarization;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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