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Mandar Prafullachandra Oak

Personal Details

First Name:Mandar
Middle Name:Prafullachandra
Last Name:Oak
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:poa1
http://www.adelaide.edu.au/directory/mandar.oak
Mandar P. Oak 10 Pulteney Street, Level 3 School of Economics University of Adelaide SA 5005, Australia
Terminal Degree:2002 Department of Economics; Cornell University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

School of Economics
University of Adelaide

Adelaide, Australia
http://www.adelaide.edu.au/econ/

: (618) 8303 5540

Adelaide SA 5005
RePEc:edi:decadau (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2017. "Subpoena Power and Information Transmission," School of Economics Working Papers 2017-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  2. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Overlobbying and Pareto-improving Agenda Constraint," School of Economics Working Papers 2016-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  3. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," School of Economics Working Papers 2016-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  4. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar oak, 2015. "Endogenous Candidacy in Electoral Competition: A Survey," School of Economics Working Papers 2015-19, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  5. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak & Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile, 2015. "Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative Vote Rule," School of Economics Working Papers 2015-06, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  6. Seungmoon Choi & Virginie Masson & Angus Moore & Mandar Oak, 2013. "Networks and Favor Exchange Norms under Stochastic Costs," School of Economics Working Papers 2013-04, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  7. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2013. "Multiple Votes, Multiple Candidacies and Polarization," School of Economics Working Papers 2013-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  8. Mandar Oak, 2013. "Legalization of Bribe Giving when Bribe Type is Endogenous," School of Economics Working Papers 2013-06, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  9. Sara LaLumia, 2010. "Tax Preferences for Higher Education and Adult College Enrollment," Department of Economics Working Papers 2010-09, Department of Economics, Williams College.
  10. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2010. "Conflict and Leadership: Why is There a Hawkish Drift in Politics?," Discussion Papers 10-04, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  11. Mandar Oak & Anand Swamy, 2009. "Commitment and Conquest: The Case of British Rule in India," School of Economics Working Papers 2009-24, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  12. Mandar Oak & Anand Swamy, 2007. "Only Twice As Much: A Rule for Regulating Lenders," Department of Economics Working Papers 2007-06, Department of Economics, Williams College.
  13. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2006. "Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy," Working Papers 2006.83, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  14. Suman Ghosh & Alexander Karaivanov & Mandar Oak, 2005. "A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions?," Working Papers 05005, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.
  15. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2004. "Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation," Working Papers 2004.98, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  16. Rajshri Jayaraman & Mandar Oak, 2003. "The Signaling Role of Municipal Currencies in Local Development," CESifo Working Paper Series 913, CESifo Group Munich.
  17. Jayaraman, Rajshri & Mandar Oak, 2002. "Local Currency as a Development Strategy," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 106, Royal Economic Society.

Articles

  1. Bol, Damien & Dellis, Arnaud & Oak, Mandar, 2017. "Candidatures endogènes dans les élections pluralitaires : quelques explications du nombre de candidats et de leur polarisation," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 93(1-2), pages 141-171, Mars-Juin.
  2. Arnaud Dellis & Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile & Mandar Oak, 2017. "Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative-Vote Rule," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(4), pages 565-590, December.
  3. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 1-38, January.
  4. Amrita Dillon & MANDAR OAK, 2015. "Legalization of Bribe Giving when Bribe Type Is Endogenous," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(4), pages 580-604, August.
  5. Oak, Mandar & Swamy, Anand V., 2012. "Myopia or strategic behavior? Indian regimes and the East India Company in late eighteenth century India," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 352-366.
  6. Mandar Oak & Anand Swamy, 2010. "Only Twice as Much: A Rule for Regulating Lenders," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 775-803, July.
  7. Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha & Oak, Mandar P., 2008. "Coalition governments in a model of parliamentary democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 554-561, September.
  8. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2007. "Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(2), pages 229-245, September.
  9. Suman Ghosh & Alexander Karaivanov & Mandar Oak, 2007. "A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(3), pages 425-449, June.
  10. Mandar P. Oak, 2006. "On The Role Of The Primary System In Candidate Selection," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 169-190, July.
  11. Dellis, Arnaud & Oak, Mandar P., 2006. "Approval voting with endogenous candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 47-76, January.
  12. Rajshri Jayaraman & Mandar Oak, 2005. "The Signalling Role of Municipal Currencies in Local Development," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 72(288), pages 597-613, November.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Overlobbying and Pareto-improving Agenda Constraint," School of Economics Working Papers 2016-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Martin Gregor, 2016. "Tullock's Puzzle in Pay-and-Play Lobbying," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 368-389, November.
    2. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2017. "Subpoena Power and Information Transmission," School of Economics Working Papers 2017-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.

  2. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar oak, 2015. "Endogenous Candidacy in Electoral Competition: A Survey," School of Economics Working Papers 2015-19, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," School of Economics Working Papers 2016-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.

  3. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak & Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile, 2015. "Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative Vote Rule," School of Economics Working Papers 2015-06, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 1-38, January.
    2. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar oak, 2015. "Endogenous Candidacy in Electoral Competition: A Survey," School of Economics Working Papers 2015-19, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
    3. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," School of Economics Working Papers 2016-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.

  4. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2013. "Multiple Votes, Multiple Candidacies and Polarization," School of Economics Working Papers 2013-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2016. "Stability in electoral competition: A case for multiple votes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 76-102.
    2. Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2017. "Electoral Competition with Third Party Entry in the Lab," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 09-2017, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    3. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar oak, 2015. "Endogenous Candidacy in Electoral Competition: A Survey," School of Economics Working Papers 2015-19, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
    4. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," School of Economics Working Papers 2016-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
    5. Cahan, Dodge & McCabe-Dansted, John & Slinko, Arkadii, 2018. "Asymmetric equilibria in spatial competition under weakly concave scoring rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 71-74.
    6. Arnaud Dellis & Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile & Mandar Oak, 2017. "Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative-Vote Rule," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(4), pages 565-590, December.

  5. Mandar Oak, 2013. "Legalization of Bribe Giving when Bribe Type is Endogenous," School of Economics Working Papers 2013-06, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Maria Perrotta Berlin & Bei Qin & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2018. "Leniency, Asymmetric Punishment and Corruption: Evidence from China," CEIS Research Paper 431, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 23 Apr 2018.
    2. Martin Dufwenberg & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2014. "Legalizing Bribe Giving," Working Papers 515, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    3. Basu, Karna & Basu, Kaushik & Cordella, Tito, 2014. "Asymmetric punishment as an instrument of corruption control," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6933, The World Bank.
    4. Sergey V. Popov, 2016. "On Basu's Proposal: Fines Affect Bribes," Economics Working Papers 16-04, Queen's Management School, Queen's University Belfast.
    5. Emil Pain, 2015. "Regional and National Diversit y as a Factor of Public Administration Theory Development: Problem Statement," Public administration issues, Higher School of Economics, issue 5, pages 34-49.

  6. Sara LaLumia, 2010. "Tax Preferences for Higher Education and Adult College Enrollment," Department of Economics Working Papers 2010-09, Department of Economics, Williams College.

    Cited by:

    1. George B. Bulman & Caroline M. Hoxby, 2015. "The Returns to the Federal Tax Credits for Higher Education," NBER Working Papers 20833, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Schwerdt, Guido & Messer, Dolores & Wößmann, Ludger & Wolter, Stefan C., 2012. "The impact of an adult education voucher program: Evidence from a randomized field experiment," Munich Reprints in Economics 19921, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    3. Turner, Nick, 2010. "Why Don’t Taxpayers Maximize their Tax-Based Student Aid? Salience and Inertial in Program Selection," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt0pb3f440, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    4. Elsayed, Mahmoud A.A., 2016. "The Impact of Education Tax Benefits on College Completion," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 16-30.
    5. Bednar, Steven & Gicheva, Dora, 2013. "Tax benefits for graduate education: Incentives for whom?," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 181-197.
    6. Bergman, Peter & Denning, Jeffrey T. & Manoli, Dayanand, 2017. "Broken Tax Breaks? Evidence from a Tax Credit Information Experiment with 1,000,000 Students," IZA Discussion Papers 10997, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    7. Susan Dynarski & Judith Scott-Clayton, 2016. "Tax Benefits for College Attendance," NBER Working Papers 22127, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Turner, Nicholas, 2011. "The Effect of Tax-Based Federal Student Aid on College Enrollment," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 64(3), pages 839-861, September.
    9. Turner Nicholas, 2011. "Why Don't Taxpayers Maximize their Tax-Based Student Aid? Salience and Inertia in Program Selection," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-24, December.

  7. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2010. "Conflict and Leadership: Why is There a Hawkish Drift in Politics?," Discussion Papers 10-04, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.

    Cited by:

    1. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan C McCannon, 2011. "The Effect of the Election of Prosecutors on Criminal Trials," Discussion Papers 11-08, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    2. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan C McCannon, 2010. "Prosecutorial Retention: Signaling by Trial," Discussion Papers 10-11, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.

  8. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2006. "Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy," Working Papers 2006.83, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

    Cited by:

    1. Hughes, Niall, 2015. "Voting In Legislative Elections Under Plurality Rule," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 03, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    2. Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2013. "Coalition governments, cabinet size, and the common pool problem: Evidence from the German states," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 356-376.
    3. Amedeo Piolatto, 2009. "Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: study of voters' representativeness," Working Papers. Serie AD 2009-14, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    4. Tridimas, George, 2011. "The political economy of power-sharing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 328-342, June.
    5. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Kalyan Chatterjee & Tomas Sjostrom, 2009. "Pre-Electoral Coalitions and Post-Election Bargaining," Discussion Papers 09-10, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    6. Bjorvatn, Kjetil & Naghavi, Alireza, 2011. "Rent seeking and regime stability in rentier states," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 740-748.
    7. Luca Murrau, 2006. "An Overview Across the New Political Economy Literature," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(28), pages 1-12.
    8. Gersbach, Hans & Schneider, Maik T., 2012. "Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 173-192.
    9. Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005.
    10. Tsuchimoto Menkyna, Fusako, 2014. "A theory of ethnic diversity and income distribution: A legislative bargaining approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 52-67.

  9. Suman Ghosh & Alexander Karaivanov & Mandar Oak, 2005. "A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions?," Working Papers 05005, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.

    Cited by:

    1. Garth Heutel, 2009. "Crowding Out and Crowding In of Private Donations and Government Grants," NBER Working Papers 15004, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Luca Corazzini & Christopher Cotton & Paola Valbonesi, 2013. "Too many charities? Insight from an experiment with multiple public goods and contribution thresholds," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0171, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    3. Itaya, Jun-ichi & Mizushima, Atsue, 2016. "Should income inequality be praised? Multiple public goods provision, income distribution, and social welfare," Discussion paper series. A 298, Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University.
    4. Corazzini, Luca & Cotton, Christopher & Valbonesi, Paola, 2015. "Donor coordination in project funding: Evidence from a threshold public goods experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 16-29.

  10. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2004. "Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation," Working Papers 2004.98, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

    Cited by:

    1. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Kalyan Chatterjee & Tomas Sjostrom, 2009. "Pre-Electoral Coalitions and Post-Election Bargaining," Discussion Papers 09-10, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    2. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2006. "Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy," Working Papers 2006.83, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005.
    4. Benoît Le Maux & Yvon Rocaboy, 2016. "Competition in fragmentation among political coalitions: theory and evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(1), pages 67-94, April.
    5. Pech, Gerald, 2012. "Intra-party decision making, party formation, and moderation in multiparty systems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 14-22.

  11. Rajshri Jayaraman & Mandar Oak, 2003. "The Signaling Role of Municipal Currencies in Local Development," CESifo Working Paper Series 913, CESifo Group Munich.

    Cited by:

    1. Degens, Philipp, 2013. "Alternative Geldkonzepte - ein Literaturbericht," MPIfG Discussion Paper 13/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

Articles

  1. Arnaud Dellis & Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile & Mandar Oak, 2017. "Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative-Vote Rule," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(4), pages 565-590, December.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 1-38, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Amrita Dillon & MANDAR OAK, 2015. "Legalization of Bribe Giving when Bribe Type Is Endogenous," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(4), pages 580-604, August.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Oak, Mandar & Swamy, Anand V., 2012. "Myopia or strategic behavior? Indian regimes and the East India Company in late eighteenth century India," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 352-366.

    Cited by:

    1. Chaudhary, Latika & Rubin, Jared, 2016. "Religious identity and the provision of public goods: Evidence from the Indian Princely States," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 461-483.

  5. Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha & Oak, Mandar P., 2008. "Coalition governments in a model of parliamentary democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 554-561, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2007. "Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(2), pages 229-245, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 1-38, January.
    2. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar oak, 2015. "Endogenous Candidacy in Electoral Competition: A Survey," School of Economics Working Papers 2015-19, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
    3. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," School of Economics Working Papers 2016-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
    4. Sandro Brusco & Jaideep Roy, 2007. "Aggregate Uncertainty in the Citizen Candidate Model Yields Extremist Parties," Department of Economics Working Papers 07-03, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
    5. Jorge Gonzalez Suitt & Axel Guyon & Thibault Hennion & Rida Laraki & Xavier Starkloff & Sophie Thibault & Benjamin Favreau, 2014. "Vers un système de vote plus juste ?," Working Papers hal-01061100, HAL.

  7. Suman Ghosh & Alexander Karaivanov & Mandar Oak, 2007. "A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(3), pages 425-449, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Mandar P. Oak, 2006. "On The Role Of The Primary System In Candidate Selection," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 169-190, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke & Marina Riem, 2017. "Do Parties Punish MPs for Voting Against the Party Line?," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 63(3), pages 317-332.

  9. Dellis, Arnaud & Oak, Mandar P., 2006. "Approval voting with endogenous candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 47-76, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2016. "Stability in electoral competition: A case for multiple votes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 76-102.
    2. Jordi Massó & Marc Vorsatz, 2006. "Weighted Approval Voting," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 668.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    3. Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2017. "Electoral Competition with Third Party Entry in the Lab," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 09-2017, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    4. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 1-38, January.
    5. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar oak, 2015. "Endogenous Candidacy in Electoral Competition: A Survey," School of Economics Working Papers 2015-19, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
    6. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," School of Economics Working Papers 2016-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
    7. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2009. "Size approval voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1187-1210, May.
    8. Miguel Ballester & Pedro Rey-Biel, 2009. "Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(3), pages 477-494, September.
    9. Arnaud Dellis & Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile & Mandar Oak, 2017. "Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative-Vote Rule," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(4), pages 565-590, December.
    10. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2007. "Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(2), pages 229-245, September.
    11. Dellis, Arnaud, 2009. "Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 772-801, March.

  10. Rajshri Jayaraman & Mandar Oak, 2005. "The Signalling Role of Municipal Currencies in Local Development," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 72(288), pages 597-613, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 17 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (9) 2006-07-21 2010-03-13 2011-05-24 2013-03-09 2015-03-22 2015-11-01 2016-02-12 2016-03-17 2017-04-09. Author is listed
  2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (6) 2006-07-21 2010-03-13 2011-05-24 2013-03-09 2015-03-22 2016-02-12. Author is listed
  3. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (4) 2007-01-14 2013-04-20 2016-03-17 2017-04-09
  4. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (3) 2006-07-21 2013-04-20 2016-02-12
  5. NEP-HIS: Business, Economic & Financial History (2) 2010-10-02 2011-03-05
  6. NEP-IFN: International Finance (2) 2002-07-08 2004-05-02
  7. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (2) 2006-07-21 2007-01-14
  8. NEP-CWA: Central & Western Asia (1) 2013-04-20
  9. NEP-DEV: Development (1) 2011-03-05
  10. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (1) 2013-04-20
  11. NEP-NET: Network Economics (1) 2013-04-20
  12. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2013-04-20
  13. NEP-SOC: Social Norms & Social Capital (1) 2013-04-20

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