IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/e/poa1.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Mandar Oak

Personal Details

First Name:Mandar
Middle Name:Prafullachandra
Last Name:Oak
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:poa1
https://researchers.adelaide.edu.au/profile/mandar.oak
Mandar P. Oak 10 Pulteney Street, Level 3 School of Economics University of Adelaide SA 5005, Australia
Terminal Degree:2002 Department of Economics; Cornell University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

School of Economics and Public Policy
University of Adelaide

Adelaide, Australia
https://able.adelaide.edu.au/economics-and-public-policy/
RePEc:edi:decadau (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles Chapters

Working papers

  1. Umair Khalil & Mandar Oak & Sundar Ponnusamy, 2020. "Political Favoritism by Powerful Politicians: Evidence from Chief Ministers in India," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2020-09, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
  2. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2017. "Subpoena Power and Information Transmission," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2017-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
  3. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Overlobbying and Pareto-improving Agenda Constraint," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2016-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
  4. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2016-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
  5. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar oak, 2015. "Endogenous Candidacy in Electoral Competition: A Survey," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2015-19, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
  6. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak & Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile, 2015. "Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative Vote Rule," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2015-06, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
  7. Seungmoon Choi & Virginie Masson & Angus Moore & Mandar Oak, 2013. "Networks and Favor Exchange Norms under Stochastic Costs," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2013-04, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
  8. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2013. "Multiple Votes, Multiple Candidacies and Polarization," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2013-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
  9. Mandar Oak, 2013. "Legalization of Bribe Giving when Bribe Type is Endogenous," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2013-06, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
  10. Sara LaLumia, 2010. "Tax Preferences for Higher Education and Adult College Enrollment," Department of Economics Working Papers 2010-09, Department of Economics, Williams College.
  11. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2010. "Conflict and Leadership: Why is There a Hawkish Drift in Politics?," Discussion Papers 10-04, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  12. Mandar Oak & Anand Swamy, 2009. "Commitment and Conquest: The Case of British Rule in India," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2009-24, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
  13. Mandar Oak & Anand Swamy, 2007. "Only Twice As Much: A Rule for Regulating Lenders," Department of Economics Working Papers 2007-06, Department of Economics, Williams College.
  14. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2006. "Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy," Working Papers 2006.83, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  15. Suman Ghosh & Alexander Karaivanov & Mandar Oak, 2005. "A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions?," Working Papers 05005, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.
  16. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2004. "Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation," Working Papers 2004.98, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  17. Rajshri Jayaraman & Mandar Oak, 2003. "The Signaling Role of Municipal Currencies in Local Development," CESifo Working Paper Series 913, CESifo.
  18. Jayaraman, Rajshri & Mandar Oak, 2002. "Local Currency as a Development Strategy," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 106, Royal Economic Society.

Articles

  1. Khalil, Umair & Oak, Mandar & Ponnusamy, Sundar, 2021. "Political favoritism by powerful politicians: Evidence from chief ministers in India," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
  2. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2020. "Subpoena power and informational lobbying," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 188-234, April.
  3. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2019. "Informational Lobbying and Pareto-Improving Agenda Constraint," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 579-618.
  4. V. Masson & S. Choi & A. Moore & M. Oak, 2018. "A model of informal favor exchange on networks," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(5), pages 639-656, October.
  5. Bol, Damien & Dellis, Arnaud & Oak, Mandar, 2017. "Candidatures endogènes dans les élections pluralitaires : quelques explications du nombre de candidats et de leur polarisation," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 93(1-2), pages 141-171, Mars-Juin.
  6. Arnaud Dellis & Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile & Mandar Oak, 2017. "Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative-Vote Rule," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(4), pages 565-590, December.
  7. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 1-38, January.
  8. Amrita Dillon & MANDAR OAK, 2015. "Legalization of Bribe Giving when Bribe Type Is Endogenous," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(4), pages 580-604, August.
  9. Oak, Mandar & Swamy, Anand V., 2012. "Myopia or strategic behavior? Indian regimes and the East India Company in late eighteenth century India," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 352-366.
  10. Mandar Oak & Anand Swamy, 2010. "Only Twice as Much: A Rule for Regulating Lenders," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 775-803, July.
  11. Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha & Oak, Mandar P., 2008. "Coalition governments in a model of parliamentary democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 554-561, September.
  12. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2007. "Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(2), pages 229-245, September.
  13. Suman Ghosh & Alexander Karaivanov & Mandar Oak, 2007. "A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(3), pages 425-449, June.
  14. Mandar P. Oak, 2006. "On The Role Of The Primary System In Candidate Selection," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 169-190, July.
  15. Dellis, Arnaud & Oak, Mandar P., 2006. "Approval voting with endogenous candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 47-76, January.
  16. Rajshri Jayaraman & Mandar Oak, 2005. "The Signalling Role of Municipal Currencies in Local Development," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 72(288), pages 597-613, November.

Chapters

  1. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures Using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," Studies in Political Economy, in: Maria Gallego & Norman Schofield (ed.), The Political Economy of Social Choices, pages 21-54, Springer.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Umair Khalil & Mandar Oak & Sundar Ponnusamy, 2020. "Political Favoritism by Powerful Politicians: Evidence from Chief Ministers in India," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2020-09, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.

    Cited by:

    1. Makkar, Karan, 2023. "Defector Politicians and Economic Growth: Evidence from India," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    2. Asatryan, Zareh & Baskaran, Thushyanthan & Birkholz, Carlo & Hufschmidt, Patrick, 2023. "Favoritism by the governing elite," ZEW Discussion Papers 23-053, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
      • Asatryan, Zareh & Baskaran, Thushyanthan & Birkholz, Carlo & Hufschmidt, Patrick, 2023. "Favoritism by the governing elite," Ruhr Economic Papers 1029, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    3. Mattos, Enlinson & Politi, Ricardo & Morata, Rodrigo, 2021. "Birthplace favoritism and the distribution of budget amendments in Brazil: Evidence from nondistrict elections," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).

  2. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Overlobbying and Pareto-improving Agenda Constraint," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2016-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.

    Cited by:

    1. Brittany Feor & Blair Long & Eric Richert, 2018. "Who Uses Commercial Lobbying Firms," Working Paper 1409, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    2. Martin Gregor, 2016. "Tullock's Puzzle in Pay-and-Play Lobbying," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 368-389, November.
    3. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2017. "Subpoena Power and Information Transmission," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2017-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.

  3. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2016-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.

    Cited by:

    1. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2022. "Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-17, June.
    2. Dodge Cahan & Arkadii Slinko, 2018. "Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(2), pages 259-279, August.
    3. Ružica Savčić & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Apostolic voting," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 1400-1417, November.
    4. Bol, Damien & Matakos, Konstantinos & Troumpounis, Orestis & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2019. "Electoral rules, strategic entry and polarization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).

  4. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar oak, 2015. "Endogenous Candidacy in Electoral Competition: A Survey," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2015-19, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.

    Cited by:

    1. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2016-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.

  5. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak & Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile, 2015. "Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative Vote Rule," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2015-06, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.

    Cited by:

    1. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2016-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    2. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2013. "Multiple Votes, Multiple Candidacies and Polarization," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2013-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    3. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar oak, 2015. "Endogenous Candidacy in Electoral Competition: A Survey," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2015-19, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.

  6. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2013. "Multiple Votes, Multiple Candidacies and Polarization," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2013-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.

    Cited by:

    1. Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2016. "Stability in electoral competition: A case for multiple votes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 76-102.
    2. Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2017. "Electoral Competition with Third Party Entry in the Lab," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 09-2017, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    3. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2016-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    4. Arnaud Dellis, 2022. "Does Party Polarization Affect the Electoral Prospects of a New Centrist Candidate?," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-20, July.
    5. Cahan, Dodge & McCabe-Dansted, John & Slinko, Arkadii, 2018. "Asymmetric equilibria in spatial competition under weakly concave scoring rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 71-74.
    6. Arnaud Dellis & Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile & Mandar Oak, 2017. "Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative-Vote Rule," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(4), pages 565-590, December.
    7. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar oak, 2015. "Endogenous Candidacy in Electoral Competition: A Survey," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2015-19, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    8. Bol, Damien & Matakos, Konstantinos & Troumpounis, Orestis & Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2019. "Electoral rules, strategic entry and polarization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).

  7. Mandar Oak, 2013. "Legalization of Bribe Giving when Bribe Type is Endogenous," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2013-06, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.

    Cited by:

    1. Basu, Karna & Basu, Kaushik & Cordella, Tito, 2014. "Asymmetric punishment as an instrument of corruption control," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6933, The World Bank.
    2. Basu,Kaushik, 2015. "The republic of beliefs : a new approach to ?law and economics?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7259, The World Bank.
    3. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2022. "Petty Corruption And Citizen Reports," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 831-848, May.
    4. Hu, Lin & Oak, Mandar, 2023. "Intermediated corruption under asymmetric punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 215(C), pages 490-499.
    5. Popov, Sergey V, 2017. "On Basu s Proposal: Fines Affect Bribes," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2017/11, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    6. Dasgupta, Utteeyo & Radoniqi, Fatos, 2023. "Republic of beliefs: An experimental investigation✰," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 30-43.
    7. Dmitriy Knyazev, 2023. "How to fight corruption: Carrots and sticks," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(2), pages 413-429, April.
    8. Maria Perrotta Berlin & Bei Qin & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2018. "Leniency, Asymmetric Punishment and Corruption: Evidence from China," CEIS Research Paper 431, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 23 Apr 2018.
    9. Martin Dufwenberg & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2014. "Legalizing Bribe Giving," Working Papers 515, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    10. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2016. "The Welfare Effects of Consumers' Reports of Bribery," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 516-534, April.
    11. Lin Hu & Mandar Oak, 2023. "Can asymmetric punishment deter endogenous bribery," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 3-21, January.
    12. Paul Missios & Ida Ferrara, 2015. "Trust, Ability-to-Pay, and Charitable Giving," Working Papers 061, Ryerson University, Department of Economics.
    13. Hong, Fuhai & Yin, Zhendong, 2020. "Collusion, extortion and the government’s organizational structure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 1-23.
    14. Jun Hu, 2021. "Asymmetric punishment, Leniency and Harassment Bribes in China: a selective survey," Working Papers hal-03119491, HAL.
    15. Emil Pain, 2015. "Regional and National Diversit y as a Factor of Public Administration Theory Development: Problem Statement," Public administration issues, Higher School of Economics, issue 5, pages 34-49.

  8. Sara LaLumia, 2010. "Tax Preferences for Higher Education and Adult College Enrollment," Department of Economics Working Papers 2010-09, Department of Economics, Williams College.

    Cited by:

    1. Shogher Ohannessian & Ben Ost, 2022. "Do EITC eligibility rules encourage college enrollment?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(4), pages 1540-1558, October.
    2. Estelle Herbaut & Koen Geven, 2019. "What Works to Reduce Inequalities in Higher Education? A Systematic Review of the (Quasi-)Experimental Literature on Outreach and Financial Aid," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/527ht1a96e8, Sciences Po.
    3. George B. Bulman & Caroline M. Hoxby, 2015. "The Returns to the Federal Tax Credits for Higher Education," NBER Working Papers 20833, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Turner, Nick, 2010. "Why Don’t Taxpayers Maximize their Tax-Based Student Aid? Salience and Inertial in Program Selection," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt0pb3f440, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    5. Elsayed, Mahmoud A.A., 2016. "The Impact of Education Tax Benefits on College Completion," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 16-30.
    6. Bednar, Steven & Gicheva, Dora, 2013. "Tax benefits for graduate education: Incentives for whom?," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 181-197.
    7. Day Manoli & Nicholas Turner, 2018. "Cash-on-Hand and College Enrollment: Evidence from Population Tax Data and the Earned Income Tax Credit," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 242-271, May.
    8. Estelle Herbaut & Koen Geven, 2019. "What Works to Reduce Inequalities in Higher Education? A Systematic Review of the (Quasi-)Experimental Literature on Outreach and Financial Aid," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03456943, HAL.
    9. Estelle Herbaut & Koen Geven, 2019. "What Works to Reduce Inequalities in Higher Education? A Systematic Review of the (Quasi-)Experimental Literature on Outreach and Financial Aid," Working Papers hal-03456943, HAL.
    10. Schwerdt, Guido & Messer, Dolores & Wößmann, Ludger & Wolter, Stefan C., 2012. "The impact of an adult education voucher program: Evidence from a randomized field experiment," Munich Reprints in Economics 19921, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    11. Bergman, Peter & Denning, Jeffrey T. & Manoli, Dayanand, 2017. "Broken Tax Breaks? Evidence from a Tax Credit Information Experiment with 1,000,000 Students," IZA Discussion Papers 10997, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Susan Dynarski & Judith Scott-Clayton, 2016. "Tax Benefits for College Attendance," NBER Working Papers 22127, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Turner, Nicholas, 2011. "The Effect of Tax-Based Federal Student Aid on College Enrollment," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 64(3), pages 839-861, September.
    14. Turner Nicholas, 2011. "Why Don't Taxpayers Maximize their Tax-Based Student Aid? Salience and Inertia in Program Selection," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-24, December.

  9. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2010. "Conflict and Leadership: Why is There a Hawkish Drift in Politics?," Discussion Papers 10-04, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.

    Cited by:

    1. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan C McCannon, 2011. "The Effect of the Election of Prosecutors on Criminal Trials," Discussion Papers 11-08, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    2. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan C McCannon, 2010. "Prosecutorial Retention: Signaling by Trial," Discussion Papers 10-11, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    3. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Amit K Chattopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2022. "A model of conflict and leadership: Is there a hawkish drift in politics?," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(1), pages 1-21, January.

  10. Mandar Oak & Anand Swamy, 2007. "Only Twice As Much: A Rule for Regulating Lenders," Department of Economics Working Papers 2007-06, Department of Economics, Williams College.

    Cited by:

    1. Cameron, Alistair & Oak, Mandar & Shan, Yaping, 2021. "Peer monitoring and Islamic microfinance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 337-358.

  11. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2006. "Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy," Working Papers 2006.83, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

    Cited by:

    1. Hughes, Niall, 2015. "Voting In Legislative Elections Under Plurality Rule," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 03, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    2. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2022. "Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-17, June.
    3. Piolatto, Amedeo, 2011. "Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: Which is most representative of voters?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 311-327, June.
    4. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Kalyan Chatterjee & Tomas Sjostrom, 2010. "Pre-Electoral Coalitions and Post-Election Bargaining," Discussion Papers 09-10r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    5. Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2013. "Coalition governments, cabinet size, and the common pool problem: Evidence from the German states," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 165, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    6. Luca Murrau, 2006. "An Overview Across the New Political Economy Literature," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(28), pages 1-12.
    7. Gersbach, Hans & Schneider, Maik T., 2012. "Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 173-192.
    8. Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005.
    9. Tridimas, George, 2011. "The political economy of power-sharing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 328-342, June.
    10. Blane D. Lewis & Adrianus Hendrawan, 2018. "The impact of mayor-council coalitions on local government spending, service delivery, and corruption in Indonesia," Departmental Working Papers 2018-19, The Australian National University, Arndt-Corden Department of Economics.
    11. Lewis, Blane D. & Hendrawan, Adrianus, 2019. "The impact of majority coalitions on local government spending, service delivery, and corruption in Indonesia," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 178-191.
    12. Bjorvatn, Kjetil & Naghavi, Alireza, 2011. "Rent seeking and regime stability in rentier states," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 740-748.
    13. Tsuchimoto Menkyna, Fusako, 2014. "A theory of ethnic diversity and income distribution: A legislative bargaining approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 52-67.

  12. Suman Ghosh & Alexander Karaivanov & Mandar Oak, 2005. "A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions?," Working Papers 05005, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.

    Cited by:

    1. Garth Heutel, 2009. "Crowding Out and Crowding In of Private Donations and Government Grants," NBER Working Papers 15004, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Luca Corazzini & Christopher Cotton & Paola Valbonesi, 2013. "Too many charities? Insight from an experiment with multiple public goods and contribution thresholds," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0171, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    3. Eckel, Catherine & Guney, Begum & Uler, Neslihan, 2020. "Independent vs. Coordinated Fundraising: Understanding the Role of Information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    4. Jun-ichi Itaya & Atsue Mizushima, 2016. "Should Income Inequality be Praised? Multiple Public Goods Provision, Income Distribution and Social Welfare," CESifo Working Paper Series 6215, CESifo.
    5. Corazzini, Luca & Cotton, Christopher & Valbonesi, Paola, 2015. "Donor coordination in project funding: Evidence from a threshold public goods experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 16-29.
    6. Heywood, John S. & Li, Dongyang & Ye, Guangliang, 2023. "Private provision of price excludable public goods by rivals," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 291-307.
    7. Tilak Sanyal, 2016. "Pareto Improving Redistribution in the Case of Private Provision of Multiple Pure Public Goods," South Asian Journal of Macroeconomics and Public Finance, , vol. 5(2), pages 220-230, December.
    8. Clive D. Fraser, 2022. "Faith? Hope? Charity? Religion explains giving when warm glow and impure altruism do not," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 90(5), pages 500-523, September.
    9. Kundu, Rajendra P. & Pandey, Siddhigyan, 2021. "Multiple Public Goods In Networks," Working Papers 21/345, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
    10. Daniel A Brent & Nathan W Chan, 2019. "Local Public Goods and the Crowding-out Hypothesis: Evidence from Civic Crowdfunding," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(3), pages 2142-2154.

  13. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2004. "Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation," Working Papers 2004.98, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

    Cited by:

    1. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2022. "Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-17, June.
    2. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Kalyan Chatterjee & Tomas Sjostrom, 2010. "Pre-Electoral Coalitions and Post-Election Bargaining," Discussion Papers 09-10r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    3. Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Mandar Oak, 2006. "Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy," Working Papers 2006.83, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    4. Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005.
    5. Benoît Le Maux & Yvon Rocaboy, 2016. "Competition in fragmentation among political coalitions: theory and evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 167(1), pages 67-94, April.
    6. Pech, Gerald, 2012. "Intra-party decision making, party formation, and moderation in multiparty systems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 14-22.
    7. Paolo Balduzzi & Sandro Brusco, 2019. "Proportional Systems with Free Entry. A Citizen-Candidate Model," Department of Economics Working Papers 19-01, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.

  14. Rajshri Jayaraman & Mandar Oak, 2003. "The Signaling Role of Municipal Currencies in Local Development," CESifo Working Paper Series 913, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Baptiste Desquilbet & Etienne Farvaque, 2022. "'As one dies, so dies the other' ? On local complementary currencies as two-sided platforms," Working Papers halshs-03518592, HAL.
    2. Degens, Philipp, 2013. "Alternative Geldkonzepte - ein Literaturbericht," MPIfG Discussion Paper 13/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.

  15. Jayaraman, Rajshri & Mandar Oak, 2002. "Local Currency as a Development Strategy," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 106, Royal Economic Society.

    Cited by:

    1. Katerina Gawthorpe, 2016. "Impact Evaluation of Scenario with Local Currencies: DSGE Model," EcoMod2016 9755, EcoMod.

Articles

  1. Khalil, Umair & Oak, Mandar & Ponnusamy, Sundar, 2021. "Political favoritism by powerful politicians: Evidence from chief ministers in India," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2020. "Subpoena power and informational lobbying," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 188-234, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Torun Dewan & John W Patty, 2020. "Editors’ introduction," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 185-187, April.
    2. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence," SocArXiv 47e26, Center for Open Science.
    3. Clement Minaudier, 2022. "The Value of Confidential Policy Information: Persuasion, Transparency, and Influence," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 570-612.

  3. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2019. "Informational Lobbying and Pareto-Improving Agenda Constraint," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 579-618.

    Cited by:

    1. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2020. "Subpoena power and informational lobbying," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(2), pages 188-234, April.

  4. V. Masson & S. Choi & A. Moore & M. Oak, 2018. "A model of informal favor exchange on networks," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(5), pages 639-656, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Kenan Huremovic, 2015. "A Noncooperative Model of Contest Network Formation," AMSE Working Papers 1521, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised Feb 2015.
    2. Nicole Tabasso, 2015. "Diffusion of Multiple Information: On Information Resilience and the Power of Segregation," Working Papers 2015.55, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

  5. Arnaud Dellis & Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile & Mandar Oak, 2017. "Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative-Vote Rule," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(4), pages 565-590, December.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 1-38, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Amrita Dillon & MANDAR OAK, 2015. "Legalization of Bribe Giving when Bribe Type Is Endogenous," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(4), pages 580-604, August.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Oak, Mandar & Swamy, Anand V., 2012. "Myopia or strategic behavior? Indian regimes and the East India Company in late eighteenth century India," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 352-366.

    Cited by:

    1. Roy, Tirthankar, 2019. "State capacity and the economic history of colonial India," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 100723, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Latika Chaudhary & Jared Rubin, 2013. "Religious Identity and the Provision of Public Goods: Evidence from the Indian Princely States," Working Papers 13-26, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.

  9. Mandar Oak & Anand Swamy, 2010. "Only Twice as Much: A Rule for Regulating Lenders," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 775-803, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  10. Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha & Oak, Mandar P., 2008. "Coalition governments in a model of parliamentary democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 554-561, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  11. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2007. "Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(2), pages 229-245, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2016-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    2. Sandro Brusco & Jaideep Roy, 2007. "Aggregate Uncertainty in the Citizen Candidate Model Yields Extremist Parties," Department of Economics Working Papers 07-03, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
    3. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2013. "Multiple Votes, Multiple Candidacies and Polarization," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2013-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    4. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar oak, 2015. "Endogenous Candidacy in Electoral Competition: A Survey," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2015-19, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    5. Jorge Gonzalez Suitt & Axel Guyon & Thibault Hennion & Rida Laraki & Xavier Starkloff & Sophie Thibault & Benjamin Favreau, 2014. "Vers un système de vote plus juste ?," Working Papers hal-01061100, HAL.

  12. Suman Ghosh & Alexander Karaivanov & Mandar Oak, 2007. "A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(3), pages 425-449, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  13. Mandar P. Oak, 2006. "On The Role Of The Primary System In Candidate Selection," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 169-190, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke & Marina Riem, 2017. "Do Parties Punish MPs for Voting Against the Party Line?," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 63(3), pages 317-332.
    2. Seok-ju Cho & Insun Kang, 2015. "Open primaries and crossover voting," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(3), pages 351-379, July.
    3. Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke, 2017. "Do Bundestag MPs Who Fail to Toe the Party Line Get Told Off," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 70(12), pages 26-29, June.

  14. Dellis, Arnaud & Oak, Mandar P., 2006. "Approval voting with endogenous candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 47-76, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Xefteris, Dimitrios, 2016. "Stability in electoral competition: A case for multiple votes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 76-102.
    2. Nikolas Tsakas & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2017. "Electoral Competition with Third Party Entry in the Lab," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 09-2017, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    3. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2016-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    4. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2009. "Size approval voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1187-1210, May.
    5. Arnaud Dellis & Alexandre Gauthier-Belzile & Mandar Oak, 2017. "Policy Polarization and Strategic Candidacy in Elections under the Alternative-Vote Rule," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(4), pages 565-590, December.
    6. Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "The Leader Rule," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 21(1), pages 113-136, January.
    7. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2007. "Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(2), pages 229-245, September.
    8. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2013. "Multiple Votes, Multiple Candidacies and Polarization," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2013-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    9. Jordi Massó & Marc Vorsatz, 2006. "Weighted Approval Voting," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 668.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    10. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar oak, 2015. "Endogenous Candidacy in Electoral Competition: A Survey," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2015-19, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    11. Miguel Ballester & Pedro Rey-Biel, 2009. "Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(3), pages 477-494, September.
    12. Dellis, Arnaud, 2009. "Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 772-801, March.

  15. Rajshri Jayaraman & Mandar Oak, 2005. "The Signalling Role of Municipal Currencies in Local Development," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 72(288), pages 597-613, November. See citations under working paper version above.

Chapters

  1. Damien Bol & Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Comparison of Voting Procedures Using Models of Electoral Competition with Endogenous Candidacy," Studies in Political Economy, in: Maria Gallego & Norman Schofield (ed.), The Political Economy of Social Choices, pages 21-54, Springer.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of chapters recorded.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Mandar Prafullachandra Oak should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.