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The republic of beliefs : a new approach to ?law and economics?

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  • Basu,Kaushik

Abstract

The discipline of law and economics deals with wide-ranging topics, from competition and environmental policy to crime control, and has been instrumental in determining how an economy performs. Yet its success has fallen short of its potential. The discipline?s shortcomings are nowhere as visible as in developing economies, where a common refrain is how the law looks good on paper but does not get implemented. This paper articulates a methodological flaw that underlies much of contemporary law and economics, and argues that there is an intimate connection between human beliefs and expectations, on the one hand, and the effectiveness of the law, on the other. I propose a new approach to law and economics that is rooted in game theory and rectifies the flaw. It is argued that this approach can open up new areas of research and be marshalled to address some of the more pressing policy challenges of our time.

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  • Basu,Kaushik, 2015. "The republic of beliefs : a new approach to ?law and economics?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7259, The World Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:7259
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    Cited by:

    1. Hoff, Karla & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2016. "Striving for balance in economics: Towards a theory of the social determination of behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PB), pages 25-57.
    2. Boly, Amadou & Gillanders, Robert, 2017. "Effective anti-corruption policy-making: What can we learn from experimental economics?," PEGNet Policy Briefs 9/2017, PEGNet - Poverty Reduction, Equity and Growth Network, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    3. Mailath, George J. & Morris, Stephen & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2017. "Laws and authority," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 32-42.
      • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris & Andrew Postlewaite, 2016. "Laws and Authority," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-018, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Nov 2016.
      • George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris & Andrew Postlewaite, 2016. "Laws and Authority," Working Papers 082_2016, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    4. Petr Wawrosz, 2022. "How Corruption Is and Should Be Investigated by Economic Theory," Economies, MDPI, vol. 10(12), pages 1-23, December.
    5. Romaniuc Rustam, 2016. "What Makes Law to Change Behavior? An Experimental Study," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(2), pages 447-475, July.
    6. Dasgupta, Utteeyo & Radoniqi, Fatos, 2023. "Republic of beliefs: An experimental investigation✰," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 30-43.

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    Keywords

    Gender and Law; Labor Policies; Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures; Parliamentary Government; Legal Products;
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