On Basu's Proposal: Fines Affect Bribes
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More about this item
KeywordsCorruption; Bribery; Decentralization; Fines;
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-06-09 (All new papers)
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