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Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law

Author

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  • Astrid, Gamba
  • Giovanni, Immordino
  • Salvatore, Piccolo

Abstract

When Legislators award amnesties to `low-rank' criminals cooperating with the justice, top criminals may capture public officials to avoid being sanctioned. Optimal policies should anticipate this danger and fight it back by granting amnesties not only to low-rank criminals, but also to officials who plea guilty and report bribe givers. Even if the threat of being betrayed by their fellows may induce top-criminals to bribe prosecutors, these policies increase the conviction risk not only for top-criminals but also for low-rank ones, whereby increasing the risk premium that the latter require to participate the crime: the bright side of subversion of law.

Suggested Citation

  • Astrid, Gamba & Giovanni, Immordino & Salvatore, Piccolo, 2016. "Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law," Working Papers 336, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 17 May 2016.
  • Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:336
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Simone Moriconi, 2016. "Taxation, Industry Integration and Production Efficiency," CESifo Working Paper Series 6001, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Elenka Brenna & Lara Gitto, 2016. "Financing elderly care in Italy and Europe. Is there a common vision?," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def047, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    3. Grazia Cecere & Nicoletta Corrocher & Maria Luisa Mancusi, 2016. "Financial constraints and public funding for eco-innovation: Empirical evidence on European SMEs," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def046, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    4. Michele Tettamanzi, 2017. "E Many Pluribus Unum: A Behavioural Macro-Economic Agent Based Model," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def062, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    5. Tiziana Assenza & Domenico Delli Gatti & Jakob Grazzini & Giorgio Ricchiuti, 2016. "Heterogeneous Firms and International Trade: The role of productivity and financial fragility," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def042, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    6. Elena Cottini & Paolo Ghinetti, 2017. "Is it the way you live or the job you have? Health effects of lifestyles and working conditions," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def056, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    7. Luca Fiorito & Cosma Orsi, 2016. "Survival Value And A Robust, Practical, Joyless Individualism: Thomas Nixon Carver, Social Justice, And Eugenics," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def044, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Criminal Organizations; Corruption; Leniency;

    JEL classification:

    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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