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Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics

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  • Alberto Alesina
  • Salvatore Piccolo
  • Paolo Pinotti

Abstract

We investigate how criminal organizations strategically use violence to influence elections in order to get captured politicians elected. The model offers novel testable implications about the use of pre-electoral violence under different types of electoral systems and different degrees of electoral competition. We test these implications by exploiting data on homicide rates in Italy since 1887, comparing the extent of ‘electoral-violence cycles’ between areas with a higher and lower presence of organized crime, under democratic and non-democratic regimes, proportional and majoritarian elections, and between contested and non-contested districts. We provide additional evidence on the influence of organized crime on politics using parliamentary speeches of politicians elected in Sicily during the period 1945-2013.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Alesina & Salvatore Piccolo & Paolo Pinotti, 2016. "Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics," NBER Working Papers 22093, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22093
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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