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Strike one to educate one hundred: Organized crime, political selection and politicians’ ability

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  • Daniele, Gianmarco

Abstract

Although much attention has been paid to the economic effects of crime, it can also affect the political process. In this paper, we show that criminal organizations may affect political (self-)selection by discouraging high-ability individuals from entering politics. Identification derives from murders of local politicians by criminal organizations, and indicates that such a negative shock to politicians’ expected payoffs induces a strong decrease in elected politicians’ human capital. The effect is not limited to the municipality in which a political murder takes place, but also extends to nearby municipalities.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniele, Gianmarco, 2019. "Strike one to educate one hundred: Organized crime, political selection and politicians’ ability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 650-662.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:159:y:2019:i:c:p:650-662
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.021
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:pubeco:v:165:y:2018:i:c:p:201-216 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Alesina, Alberto & Piccolo, Salvatore & Pinotti, Paolo, 2016. "Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 11641, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Cavalcanti, Francisco & Daniele, Gianmarco & Galletta, Sergio, 2018. "Popularity shocks and political selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 201-216.
    4. Gianmarco Daniele & Benny Geys, 2015. "Exposing politicians’ ties to criminal organizations: the effects of local government dissolutions on electoral outcomes in southern Italian municipalities," Working Papers 2015/41, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    5. Tommaso Giommoni, 2017. "Exposition to Corruption and Political Participation: Evidence from Italian Municipalities," CESifo Working Paper Series 6645, CESifo Group Munich.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Crime; Political selection; Organized crime; Politicians’ ability;

    JEL classification:

    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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