Exposing politicians’ ties to criminal organizations: the effects of local government dissolutions on electoral outcomes in southern Italian municipalities
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Nicola Mastrorocco, 2018. "Organised Crime, Captured Politicians and the Allocation of Public Resources," Trinity Economics Papers tep1018, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2019.
More about this item
KeywordsPolitical accountability; voter turnout; elections; mafia; tax compliance;
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- H89 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Other
- O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CDM-2016-01-03 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-LAW-2016-01-03 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-POL-2016-01-03 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-URE-2016-01-03 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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