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Popularity shocks and political selection : the effects of anti-corruption audits on candidates' quality

Author

Listed:
  • Framcisco Cavalcanti

    () (Barcelona Economic Institute, University of Barcelona, Spain)

  • Gianmarco Daniele

    () (Barcelona Economic Institute, University of Barcelona, Spain)

  • Sergio Galletta

    () (IdEP, Economia, Universita' Svizzera italiana, Switzerland)

Abstract

We show that the disclosure of information about a government's conduct affects the types of candidates who stand for election. Our empirical test focuses on Brazilian city council elections in 2004 and 2008. The identification strategy exploits the randomness of the timing of the release of audit reports on the (mis)use of federal funds by local governments. We observe that when the audit finds low levels of corruption (i.e., when it represents a positive popularity shock), the parties supporting the incumbent select less-educated candidates. On the contrary, parties pick, on average, more-educated candidates when the audit reveals a high level of corruption (i.e., when it represents a negative popularity shock). These effects are stronger in municipalities that have easier access to local media. Our evidence confirms that parties are strategic players: their decisions are affected by shocks that influence the electoral race.

Suggested Citation

  • Framcisco Cavalcanti & Gianmarco Daniele & Sergio Galletta, 2016. "Popularity shocks and political selection : the effects of anti-corruption audits on candidates' quality," IdEP Economic Papers 1607, USI Università della Svizzera italiana.
  • Handle: RePEc:lug:wpidep:1607
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political selection; Corruption; Competence; Local election; Political parties; Candidates;

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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