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Are Women Pawns in the Political Game? Evidence from Elections to the Spanish Senate

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  • Berta Esteve-Volart
  • Manuel F. Bagües

Abstract

This paper investigates the potential existence of a gender bias in political parties-nomination strategies. For this purpose we use data from elections to the Spanish Senate, where candidates are listed in the ballot in alphabetical order, and order in the ballot affects votes. The evidence in this paper suggests that, in the absence of political competition, parties do not nominate the best available female candidates. Instead, parties select female candidates based on their last name, taking into account how their presence in the list affects male candidates-possibilities of success and gender statistics. Finally, to avoid political parties exploiting order in the ballot to favor particular candidates we propose to adopt ballot ordering rotation.

Suggested Citation

  • Berta Esteve-Volart & Manuel F. Bagües, 2009. "Are Women Pawns in the Political Game? Evidence from Elections to the Spanish Senate," Working Papers 2009-30, FEDEA.
  • Handle: RePEc:fda:fdaddt:2009-30
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lori Beaman & Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo & Rohini Pande & Petia Topalova, 2009. "Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 124(4), pages 1497-1540.
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    4. Amy King & Andrew Leigh, 2009. "Are Ballot Order Effects Heterogeneous?," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 90(1), pages 71-87.
    5. Ferraz, Claudio & Finan, Frederico S., 2008. "Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 3411, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    6. Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo, 2004. "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(5), pages 1409-1443, September.
    7. De Paola, Maria & Scoppa, Vincenzo & Lombardo, Rosetta, 2010. "Can gender quotas break down negative stereotypes? Evidence from changes in electoral rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(5-6), pages 344-353, June.
    8. Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini, 2013. "Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives From Selection," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 369-398, April.
    9. Liran Einav & Leeat Yariv, 2006. "What's in a Surname? The Effects of Surname Initials on Academic Success," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(1), pages 175-187, Winter.
    10. Galasso, Vincenzo & Nannicini, Tommaso, 2011. "Competing on Good Politicians," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(01), pages 79-99, February.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Folke, Olle & Rickne, Johanna, 2012. "Female representation but male rule? Party competition and the political glass ceiling," Working Paper Series, Center for Labor Studies 2012:9, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    2. Sajons, Christoph, 2016. "Information on the ballot, voter satisfaction and election turnout," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 16/05, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    3. Baltrunaite, Audinga & Bello, Piera & Casarico, Alessandra & Profeta, Paola, 2014. "Gender quotas and the quality of politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 62-74.
    4. Galasso, Vincenzo & Nannicini, Tommaso, 2013. "Men Vote in Mars, Women Vote in Venus: A Survey Experiment in the Field," CEPR Discussion Papers 9547, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Pamela Campa & Manuel Bagues, "undated". "Can Gender Quotas in Candidate Lists Empower Women? Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design," Working Papers 2017-06, Department of Economics, University of Calgary.
    6. Stepan Jurajda & Daniel Munich, 2014. "Candidate Ballot Information and Election Outcomes: The Czech Case," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp500, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    7. Galasso, Vincenzo & Nannicini, Tommaso, 2016. "Persuasion and Gender: Experimental Evidence from Two Political Campaigns," CEPR Discussion Papers 11238, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Sonia Bhalotra & Irma Clots-Figueras & Lakshmi Iyer, "undated". "Pathbreakers? Women’s Electoral Success and Future Political Participation," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-277, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    9. Jean-Benoît Eymeoud & Paul Vertier, 2018. "Gender Biases: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in French Local Elections," Sciences Po publications 78, Sciences Po.
    10. repec:bla:econom:v:84:y:2017:i:335:p:454-479 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Xavier Giné & Ghazala Mansuri, 2018. "Together We Will: Experimental Evidence on Female Voting Behavior in Pakistan," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 207-235, January.
    12. Folke, Olle & Rickne, Johanna, 2014. "The Glass Ceiling in Politics: Formalization and Empirical Tests," Working Paper Series 1034, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    13. Casas, Agustin & Díaz, Guillermo & Mavridis, Christos, 2016. "The last shall be the first : failed accountability due to voters fatigue and ballot design," UC3M Working papers. Economics 22539, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    14. Bhalotra, Sonia R. & Clots-Figueras, Irma & Iyer, Lakshmi, 2013. "Path-Breakers: How Does Women's Political Participation Respond to Electoral Success?," IZA Discussion Papers 7771, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    15. Audinga Baltrunaite & Alessandra Casarico & Paola Profeta & Giulia Savio, 2016. "Let the Voters Choose Women," CESifo Working Paper Series 5693, CESifo Group Munich.
    16. Galasso, Vincenzo & Nannicini, Tommaso, 2015. "So closed: Political selection in proportional systems," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 260-273.
    17. Thushyanthan Baskaran & Zohal Hessami, 2017. "Does the election of a female leader clear the way for more women in politics?," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2017-09, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    18. Paulo Júlio & José Tavares, 2017. "The Good, the Bad and the Different: Can Gender Quotas Raise the Quality of Politicians?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 84(335), pages 454-479, July.
    19. Casas-Arce, Pablo & Saiz, Albert, 2011. "Women and Power: Unwilling, Ineffective, or Held Back?," IZA Discussion Papers 5645, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    20. Daniel Garcia & Joshua Serman, 2015. "Norms and Team Formation: Evidence from Research Partnerships," Vienna Economics Papers 1511, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    21. Bhalotra, Sonia & Clots-Figueras, Irma & Iyer, Lakshmi, 2013. "Path-Breakers: How Does Women’s Political Participation Respond to Electoral Success?," Economics Discussion Papers 9008, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    22. Framcisco Cavalcanti & Gianmarco Daniele & Sergio Galletta, 2016. "Popularity shocks and political selection : the effects of anti-corruption audits on candidates' quality," IdEP Economic Papers 1607, USI Università della Svizzera italiana.
    23. repec:esx:essedp:740 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing

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