Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement
I examine a model of optimum enforcement in which offenders can engage in activities that reduce the probability of being caught and fined. The costs associated with these avoidance activities imply that it is not necessarily optimal to set fines for offenses as high as possible. These avoidance costs also provide an incentive to screen individuals in settings where it is not optimal to deter all offenses.
Volume (Year): 21 (1990)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
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