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Arun S. Malik

Personal Details

First Name:Arun
Middle Name:S.
Last Name:Malik
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pma578
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://home.gwu.edu/~amalik/

Affiliation

(80%) Department of Economics
George Washington University

Washington, District of Columbia (United States)
http://www.gwu.edu/~econ/

: (202) 994-6150
(202) 994-6147
Monroe Hall #340, 2115 G Street, NW, Washington, DC 20052
RePEc:edi:degwuus (more details at EDIRC)

(20%) Institute for International Economic Policy (IIEP)
Elliott School of International Affairs
George Washington University

Washington, District of Columbia (United States)
http://www.gwu.edu/~iiep/

:


RePEc:edi:iigwuus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Arun Malik, 2008. "The Desirability of Forgiveness in Regulatory Enforcement," Working Papers 2008-14, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.

Articles

  1. Christian S. L. Crowley & Arun S. Malik & Gregory S. Amacher & Robert G. Haight, 2009. "Adjacency Externalities and Forest Fire Prevention," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 85(1), pages 162-185.
  2. Arun Malik, 2007. "Optimal environmental regulation based on more than just emissions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 1-16, August.
  3. Gregory S. Amacher & Arun S. Malik & Robert G. Haight, 2006. "Reducing Social Losses from Forest Fires," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 82(3), pages 367-383.
  4. Amacher, Gregory S. & Malik, Arun S. & Haight, Robert G., 2005. "Nonindustrial private landowners, fires, and the wildland-urban interface," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(5), pages 796-805, August.
  5. Gregory S. Amacher & Arun S. Malik & Robert G. Haight, 2005. "Not Getting Burned: The Importance of Fire Prevention in Forest Management," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 81(2).
  6. Gregory S. Amacher & Arun S. Malik, 2002. "Pollution Taxes When Firms Choose Technologies," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 891-906, April.
  7. Malik, Arun S., 2002. "Further Results on Permit Markets with Market Power and Cheating," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 371-390, November.
  8. Amacher, Gregory S. & Malik, Arun S., 1998. "Instrument Choice When Regulators and Firms Bargain," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 225-241, May.
  9. Amacher, Gregory S. & Malik, Arun S., 1996. "Bargaining in Environmental Regulation and the Ideal Regulator," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 233-253, March.
  10. Malik Arun S., 1993. "Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 241-257, May.
  11. Malik, Arun S, 1992. "Enforcement Costs and the Choice of Policy Instruments for Controlling Pollution," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(4), pages 714-721, October.
  12. Malik, Arun S. & Schwab, Robert M., 1991. "The economics of tax amnesties," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 29-49, October.
  13. Malik, Arun & Schwab, Robert M., 1991. "Optimal investments to establish property rights in land," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 295-309, May.
  14. Malik, Arun S., 1991. "Permanent versus interim regulations: A game-theoretic analysis," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 127-139, September.
  15. Malik, Arun S., 1990. "Markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliant," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 97-106, March.
  16. Arun S. Malik, 1990. "Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(3), pages 341-353, Autumn.

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