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Citations for "Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement"

by Arun S. Malik

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  1. Laurent Franckx, 1998. "The use of ambient inspections in environmental monitoring and enforcement when the inspection agency cannot commit itself to announced inspection probabilities," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces9835, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
  2. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1999. "Costly Sanctions and the Maximum Penalty Principle," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 100, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
  3. Ezra Friedman & Abraham L. Wickelgren, 2006. "Bayesian Juries and The Limits to Deterrence," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(1), pages 70-86, April.
  4. Eide, Erling & Rubin, Paul H. & Shepherd, Joanna M., 2006. "Economics of Crime," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 205-279, December.
  5. Giovanni Immordino & Marco Pagano, 2010. "Legal Standards, Enforcement, and Corruption," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(5), pages 1104-1132, 09.
  6. Maurice Kugler & Thierry Verdier & Yves Zenou, 2003. "Organized Crime, Corruption and Punishment," DELTA Working Papers 2003-34, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  7. Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "The use of warnings in the presence of errors," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 191-201, September.
  8. Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Samuel, Andrew, 2014. "Announced vs. surprise inspections with tipping-off," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 167-183.
  9. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, 1992. "Optimal Sanctions When the Probability of Apprehension Varies Among Individuals," NBER Working Papers 4078, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Marcel Boyer & Tracy Lewis & Wei Lin Liu, 1996. "Setting Standards for Credible Compliance and Law Enforcement," CIRANO Working Papers 96s-27, CIRANO.
  11. Philip A. Curry & Steeve Mongrain, 2008. "What you don't see can't hurt you: an economic analysis of morality laws," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 41(2), pages 583-594, May.
  12. Carmen Arguedas & Sandra Rousseau, 2008. "Learning about compliance under asymmetric information," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces0808, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
  13. Bertrand Chopard & Eric Langlais, 2009. "Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d’entreprises," Cahiers du CEREFIGE 0901, CEREFIGE (Centre Europeen de Recherche en Economie Financiere et Gestion des Entreprises), Universite de Lorraine, revised 2009.
  14. Bowles, Roger & Faure, Michael & Garoupa, Nuno, 2000. "Economic analysis of the removal of illegal gains," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 537-549, December.
  15. Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2013. "A note on the non-maximality of the optimal fines when the apprehension probability depends on the offense rate," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 131-138, August.
  16. Mongrain, Steeve & Roberts, Joanne, 2009. "Plea bargaining with budgetary constraints," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 8-12, March.
  17. Jellal, Mohamed & Souam, Said, 2014. "Incentives and optimal antitrust policy," MPRA Paper 57246, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. repec:dgr:kubcen:20059 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2014. "Regulating harmless activity to fight crime," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 113(1), pages 79-95, September.
  20. Nuno Garoupa & Hugh Gravelle, . "Does Efficient Deterrence Require that the Wealthy Should Be Able to Buy Justice?," Discussion Papers 00/07, Department of Economics, University of York.
  21. Feess, Eberhard & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2009. "Why higher punishment may reduce deterrence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 69-71, August.
  22. Parikshit Ghosh, 2009. "Making the Punishment Fit the Crime or Taliban Justice? Optimal Penalties without Commitment," Working Papers id:2014, eSocialSciences.
  23. Nussim, Jacob & Tabbach, Avraham D., 2009. "Deterrence and avoidance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 314-323, December.
  24. Joanne Roberts, 2000. "Plea Bargaining with Budgetary Constraints and Deterrence," Working Papers jorob-00-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  25. Jensen, Sissel & Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond & Sørgard, Lars, 2013. "Crime and punishment: When tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2013/2, University of Stavanger.
  26. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, 1992. "Optimal Sanctions When Individuals are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension," NBER Working Papers 4079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  27. K. L. Glen Ueng & Chiaen J. Wu, 2009. "A note on the neutrality of profit taxes and tax compliance with imperfect detection," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(1), pages 312-318.
  28. Timothy Stanley, 1995. "Radar Detectors, Fixed and Variable Costs of Crime," Law and Economics 9507002, EconWPA, revised 27 Dec 1995.
  29. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2005. "The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 11780, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  30. Elizabeth Robinson, 2004. "Land Encroachment: India`s Disappearing Common Lands," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2004-28, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  31. Marie Obidzinski & Bruno Deffains, 2009. "Real Options Theory for Law Makers," Post-Print hal-00447170, HAL.
  32. Garoupa, Nuno, 2007. "Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 461-474, July.
  33. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Iryna Topolyan, 2013. "The Attack-and-Defence Group Contests," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 049, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  34. Celik, Gorkem & Sayan, Serdar, 2005. "To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes," Microeconomics.ca working papers celik-05-08-03-12-50-26, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 06 Aug 2008.
  35. Marceau, Nicolas, 1997. "Self-selection and violence in the market for crime," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 193-201, June.
  36. Tim Friehe & Verena Utikal, 2015. "Intentions Undercover - Hiding Intentions is Considered Unfair," CESifo Working Paper Series 5218, CESifo Group Munich.
  37. Pierre Lasserre & Antoine Soubeyran, 1999. "Optimal Justice in a General Equilibrium Model with Non Observable Individual Productivities," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-37, CIRANO.
  38. Timothy Stanley, 1995. "Optimal Penalties for Concealment of Crime," Law and Economics 9507001, EconWPA, revised 27 Dec 1995.
  39. Bryan C. McCannon, 2007. "An Economic Theory of College Alcohol and Drug Policies," New York Economic Review, New York State Economics Association (NYSEA), vol. 38(1), pages 18-36.
  40. Jellal, Mohamed & Souam, Said, 2012. "A theory of antitrust enforcement game," MPRA Paper 38343, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  41. Ferrer, Rosa, 2010. "Breaking the law when others do: A model of law enforcement with neighborhood externalities," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 163-180, February.
  42. Friehe, Tim, 2009. "Precaution v. avoidance: A comparison of liability rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 214-216, December.
  43. Bose, Pinaki, 1995. "Regulatory errors, optimal fines and the level of compliance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 475-484, March.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.