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Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d’entreprises

  • Bertrand Chopard
  • Eric Langlais

L’enseignement qui est habituellement retenu des travaux empiriques réalisés à la suite de La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer et Vishny (1997), est qu’il convient de promouvoir un haut niveau de protection juridique des créanciers. A l’inverse de cette recommandation, certains pays européens (Royaume-Uni, Allemagne) ont pourtant récemment réformé leurs dispositifs touchant au droit des défaillances dans un sens qui les rapprochent de pays qui traditionnellement privilégient la préservation des emprunteurs (Etats-Unis, France). Ce papier propose une analyse du bénéfice social d’une telle orientation du droit de la défaillance, dans un modèle stylisé où la capacité de remboursement de l’emprunteur est une information privée. On étudie tout d’abord l’effet de l’orientation des règles juridiques (système pro-créanciers versus pro-débiteurs) sur le comportement des parties au contrat en fonction du type de concurrence bancaire. Nous discutons ensuite les instruments à la disposition des autorités judiciaires afin de garantir que l’évolution d’un système pro-créanciers vers un système pro-débiteurs dégage un bénéfice social. Nos résultats suggèrent qu’il existerait, en fonction de l’objectif assigné au droit, une cohérence entre l’orientation des dispositifs encadrant la défaillance et l’intensité de la concurrence bancaire.

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Paper provided by University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX in its series EconomiX Working Papers with number 2009-10.

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Length: 52 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2009-10
Contact details of provider: Postal: 200 Avenue de la République, Bât. G - 92001 Nanterre Cedex
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