Faut-il adopter un système pro-créanciers de défaillances? Une revue de la littérature
Bankruptcy choices condition, i) the efficiency of liquidation or reorganization decisions, ii) the incen-tives delivered to the debtor-in-place and its creditors. On the one hand, there is no incompatibility between a pro-creditors system and the possibility to reach informal agreements and a high proportion of firms emerging from bankruptcy as going concerns. On the other hand, credit rationing is less severe in such systems. Finally, offering a higher protection for creditors interests, pro-creditors systems let them the possibility to be more lenient. This effect favors the formal reorganization of distressed firms.
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