Soutien financier ou mise en faillite de l'entreprise? Comprendre la décision de la banque
(VF)Afin de comprendre pourquoi une banque décide la mise en faillite ou au contraire le soutien de son client en défaut de paiement, nous proposons une relecture de modèles issus de champs théoriques distincts. La littérature consacrée à la résolution des crises financières montre que la décision de la banque dépend des potentialités de redressement de la firme. Mais la théorie des contrats prouve la nécessité pour la banque d’une attitude stricte pour limiter l’aléa moral. La théorie bancaire montre que si la banque dispose d'un avantage informationnel par rapport aux tiers, elle peut adopter un comportement laxiste voire opportuniste.(VA) Banks have to choose be-tween debt re-negotiation and liquidation of their financially distressed corporate debtors. We review different models to identify key determinants of their choice. The literature on the resolution of financial distress shows that the banks’ decision is based on the financial and economic characteristics of the distressed firms. If information is asymmetric, incentive considerations induce banks to be severe. However, if banks own (or are supposed to own) information that other stakeholders do not have, banks may help their debtors in an opportunistic way.
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