IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-02418818.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

« Les déterminants du soutien abusif : une première approche empirique » Article paru dans Banque & Marchés n°47 Mai-Juin 2000 pp.42-56

Author

Listed:
  • Laurent Vilanova

    () (COACTIS - COACTIS - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2)

Abstract

La théorie bancaire souligne le rôle de production et de transmission d'information des intermédiaires financiers. La jurisprudence sur le soutien abusif remet en cause cette pensée unique : des banques sont en effet condamnées pour avoir retardé la liquidation d'entreprises non viables. A travers l'étude de 39 dossiers de soutien abusif, ce travail tente de mettre à jour les raisons d'un tel comportement. Les résultats permettent de distinguer deux types de soutien abusif : un soutien involontaire dû à un contrôle insuffisant ou à une erreur d'interprétation ; un soutien délibéré dû à la volonté du banquier de parfaire ses garanties ou à sa trop grande captivité vis-à-vis du débiteur. Abstract : The banking theory stresses the information production and certification role of financial intermediaries. However, there exists a growing evidence that banks' decisions sometimes misrepresent the actual situation of the firm. For instance, some court decisions sentence banks which have delayed the liquidation of non viable firms. This article tries to identify the determinants of this behavior through the study of 39 cases. The results enable to make a distinction between : an « involuntary support » due to a weak monitoring or a mistake in evaluation ; a « voluntary support » due to the desire of bankers to strenghten collateral or to their dependence upon their borrowers. Cet article est tiré de ma thèse soutenue en 1999 à l'I.A.E d'Aix-en-Provence (CEROG). Une version antérieure a été présentée aux Journées Internationales de l'AFFI en Juin 1999. Je remercie le comité de lecture de la revue pour ses remarques constructives. Correspondance : Laurent.Vilanova@eco.u-cergy.fr

Suggested Citation

  • Laurent Vilanova, 2000. "« Les déterminants du soutien abusif : une première approche empirique » Article paru dans Banque & Marchés n°47 Mai-Juin 2000 pp.42-56," Post-Print halshs-02418818, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02418818
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02418818
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02418818/document
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Diamond, Douglas W, 1991. "Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 689-721, August.
    2. Bester, Helmut, 1994. "The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(1), pages 72-86, February.
    3. Fama, Eugene F, 1990. "Contract Costs and Financing Decisions," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(1), pages 71-91, January.
    4. Besanko, David & Kanatas, George, 1993. "Credit Market Equilibrium with Bank Monitoring and Moral Hazard," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(1), pages 213-232.
    5. Laurent Vilanova, 1997. "La décision de prêt bancaire comme signal imparfait sur l'emprunteur," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 41(3), pages 219-246.
    6. Raghuram G. Rajan, 1994. "Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(2), pages 399-441.
    7. Gertner, Robert & Scharfstein, David, 1991. "A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1189-1222, September.
    8. Laurence Bloch & Jérôme Bourdieu & Béatrice Colin-Sédillot & Guy Longueville, 1995. "Du défaut de paiement au dépôt de bilan : les banquiers face aux PME en difficulté," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 32(1), pages 229-256.
    9. Leonard I. Nakamura, 1994. "Small borrowers and the survival of the small bank: is mouse bank Mighty or Mickey?," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, issue Nov, pages 3-15.
    10. Berlin, Mitchell & Loeys, Jan, 1988. " Bond Covenants and Delegated Monitoring," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(2), pages 397-412, June.
    11. Koonce, L & Anderson, U & Marchant, C, 1995. "Justification Of Decisions In Auditing," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 369-384.
    12. Fama, Eugene F., 1985. "What's different about banks?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 29-39, January.
    13. Rajan, Raghuram & Winton, Andrew, 1995. "Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(4), pages 1113-1146, September.
    14. Brown, Keith C & Harlow, W V & Starks, Laura T, 1996. "Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(1), pages 85-110, March.
    15. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    16. Berlin, Mitchell & John, Kose & Saunders, Anthony, 1996. "Bank Equity Stakes in Borrowing Firms and Financial Distress," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(3), pages 889-919.
    17. Leonard I. Nakamura, 1993. "Recent research in commercial banking: information and lending," Working Papers 93-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, revised 1993.
    18. John H. Boyd & Stanley L. Graham, 1991. "Investigating the banking consolidation trend," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 15(Spr), pages 3-15.
    19. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1992. "Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1367-1400, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02418818. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.