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Information Sharing, Lending and Defaults: Cross-Country Evidence

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  • Jappelli, Tullio
  • Pagano, Marco

Abstract

Theory predicts that information sharing among lenders attenuates adverse selection and moral hazard, and can therefore increase lending and reduce default rates. To test these predictions, we construct a new international data set on private credit bureaus and public credit registers. We find that bank lending is higher and proxies for default rates are lower in countries where lenders share information, regardless of the private or public nature of the information sharing mechanism. We also find that public intervention is more likely where private arrangements have not arisen spontaneously and creditor rights are poorly protected.

Suggested Citation

  • Jappelli, Tullio & Pagano, Marco, 1999. "Information Sharing, Lending and Defaults: Cross-Country Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2184, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2184
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pagano, Marco & Jappelli, Tullio, 1993. "Information Sharing in Credit Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(5), pages 1693-1718, December.
    2. Shleifer, Andrei & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-De-Silanes, Florencio & Vishny, Robert W., 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Scholarly Articles 30728041, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    3. La Porta, Rafael & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1131-1150, July.
    4. Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, 2000. "Information Sharing in Credit Markets: The European Experience," CSEF Working Papers 35, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    5. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    6. Padilla, A. Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 2000. "Sharing default information as a borrower discipline device," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(10), pages 1951-1980, December.
    7. Padilla, A Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 1997. "Endogenous Communication among Lenders and Entrepreneurial Incentives," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 10(1), pages 205-236.
    8. Levine, Ross, 1998. "The Legal Environment, Banks, and Long-Run Economic Growth," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 596-613, August.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credit Market; Default Rate; Information Sharing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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