Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device
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Other versions of this item:
- Padilla, A. Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 2000. "Sharing default information as a borrower discipline device," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(10), pages 1951-1980, December.
- Padilla, A.J. & Pagano, M., 1996. "Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device," Papers 73, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Padilla, A.J. & Pagano, M., 1999. "Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device," Papers 9911, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
- A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1999. "Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device," CSEF Working Papers 21, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- A Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1994. "Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device," CEPR Financial Markets Paper 0043, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ..
References listed on IDEAS
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"Endogenous Communication among Lenders and Entrepreneurial Incentives,"
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- Padilla, A.J. & Pagano, M., 1994. "Endogenous Communication Among Lenders and Entrepreneurial Incentives," Papers 9407, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
- Padilla, Atilano Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 1996. "Endogenous Communication Among Lenders and Entrepreneurial Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 1295, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
More about this item
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
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