Law and Finance
This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that commonâ€ law countries generally have the strongest, and french civil law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with Germanâ€ -and Scandinavianâ€ -civilâ€ law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified shareâ€ holders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1996|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 200 Littauer Center, Cambridge, MA 02138|
Web page: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/journals/hier
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:harver:1768. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.