Law and Finance
This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that commonâ€ law countries generally have the strongest, and french civil law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with Germanâ€ -and Scandinavianâ€ -civilâ€ law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified shareâ€ holders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Deininger, K & Squire, L, 1996. "Measuring Income Inequality : A New Data-Base," Papers 537, Harvard - Institute for International Development.
- Levy, Haim, 1983. " Economic Evaluation of Voting Power of Common Stock," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 38(1), pages 79-93, March.
- Marco Pagano & Fabio Panetta & Luigi Zingales, 1995.
"Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis,"
NBER Working Papers
5367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Marco Pagano & Fabio Panetta & Luigi Zingales, "undated". "Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis," CRSP working papers 330, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
- Pagano, Marco & Panetta, Fabio & Zingales, Luigi, 1996. "Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 1332, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, 1995. "Institutions And Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 207-227, November.
- Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1987.
"One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control,"
NBER Working Papers
2347, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1988. "One share-one vote and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 175-202, January.
- Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1987. "One Share/One Vote and The Market for Corporate Control," Working papers 440, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Rajan, Raghuram G & Zingales, Luigi, 1995.
" What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1421-1460, December.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1994. "What Do We Know About Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data," NBER Working Papers 4875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ross Levine, 1998.
"The legal environment, banks, and long-run economic growth,"
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Aug, pages 596-620.
- Levine, Ross, 1998. "The Legal Environment, Banks, and Long-Run Economic Growth," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 596-613, August.
- Gary Gorton & Frank A. Schmid, 1996.
"Universal Banking and the Performance of German Firms,"
NBER Working Papers
5453, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gorton, Gary & Schmid, Frank A., 2000. "Universal banking and the performance of German firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 29-80.
- Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817, December.
- Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986.
"Large Shareholders and Corporate Control,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
- Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1988. "Corporate governance : Voting rights and majority rules," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 203-235, January.
- King, Robert G. & Levine, Ross, 1993.
"Finance and growth : Schumpeter might be right,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
1083, The World Bank.
- Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, "undated".
"Stock markets, banks and economic growth ,"
CERF Discussion Paper Series
95-11, Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University.
- Maxim Boycko & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1993.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(2), pages 139-192.
- Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-1177, December.
- Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation," Scholarly Articles 29407535, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1995. "Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Indicators," MPRA Paper 23118, University Library of Munich, Germany.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:106:y:1998:i:6:p:1113-1155. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.