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La répartition des droits de vote, leur exercice et l’efficacité économique

  • Jean-Jacques Hamon
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    [fre] Cet article présente une revue de la littérature sur la répartition des droits de vote et la défense des intérêts des actionnaires minoritaires. La répartition des droits de vote au prorata de la participation au capital assure généralement la plus grande efficacité économique. En Europe continentale, et notamment en France et en Italie, le capital des entreprises cotées est très concentré et l’actionnariat de type familial est dominant. Un des déterminants le plus significatif de la structure de l’actionnariat est la qualité de la protection juridique accordée aux actionnaires minoritaires. Les marchés les plus développés relativement à l’importance de l’économie sont également ceux où les droits des actionnaires minoritaires sont les mieux protégés par la loi ou la réglementation. . Classification JEL : G32, K22, D23, G34, L21 [eng] Ownership Concentration, Corporate Voting Rights and the Efficiency of Capital Allocation . This paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems in Europe. One share-one vote encourages the selection of an efficient management team. Families are the most pronounced type of controlling shareholders in Europe, especially in France and Italy. Investor protection (by law) turns out to be crucial because, in many countries, expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders is extensive. The efficiency of capital allocation is positively correlated with the legal protection of investors. The agency model predicts larger capital markets in countries where agency costs are reined in by the law and the institutions built to support their enforcement. . JEL classifications : G32, K22, D23, G34, L21

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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.3406/ecofi.2001.3678
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    Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue d'économie financière.

    Volume (Year): 63 (2001)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 175-209

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    Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2001_num_63_3_3678
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2001.3678
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