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Gobierno Corporativo: ¿Qué es? y ¿Cómo andamos por casa?

  • Fernando Lefort

This paper presents a simple framework in order to analyze different corporate governance mechanisms and their impact on firm structures and performance. Based on recent literature on the subject, the paper discusses the validity of Demsetz’s evolution hy

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File URL: http://www.economia.uc.cl/docs/120lefoa.pdf
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Article provided by Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. in its journal Cuadernos de Economía-Latin American Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 40 (2003)
Issue (Month): 120 ()
Pages: 207-237

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Handle: RePEc:ioe:cuadec:v:40:y:2003:i:120:p:207-237
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  1. Juan Pablo Medina & Rodrigo Valdés, 1998. "Flujo de Caja y Decisiones de Inversión en Chile: Evidencia de Sociedades Anónimas Abiertas," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 35(106), pages 301-323.
  2. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1999. "Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1882, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  3. Franks, Julian R & Mayer, Colin, 2001. "Ownership and Control of German Corporations," CEPR Discussion Papers 2898, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1996. "Financial Dependence and Growth," NBER Working Papers 5758, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Megginson, William L, 1990. "Restricted Voting Stock, Acquisition Premiums, and the Market Value of Corporate Control," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 25(2), pages 175-98, May.
  6. Beck, Thorsten & Levine, Ross & Loayza, Norman, 2000. "Finance and the sources of growth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 261-300.
  7. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
  8. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov^, Simeon & Fan, Joseph P.H. & Lang, Larry H.P., 2000. "The Costs of Group Affiliation: Evidence from East Asia," CEI Working Paper Series 2000-5, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  9. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April.
  10. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1999. "A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control," NBER Working Papers 7203, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1998. "Law and Finance," Scholarly Articles 3451310, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  12. Wendy Carlin & Colin Mayer, 2002. "International Evidence on Corporate Governance: Lessons for Developing Countries," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 11(suppl_1), pages 37-59, February.
  13. N Dryden & Stephen Nickell & D Nicolitsas, 1996. "What Makes Firms Perform Well?," CEP Discussion Papers dp0308, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  14. Tobin, James, 1969. "A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 1(1), pages 15-29, February.
  15. Demsetz, Harold, 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 375-90, June.
  16. Fernando Lefort & Eduardo Walker, 2000. "The Effects Of Economic And Political Shocks On Corporate Governance Systems In Chile," Abante, Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 2(2), pages 183-206.
  17. Robert G. King & Ross Levine, 1993. "Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(3), pages 717-737.
  18. Paredes-Molina, Ricardo D. & Sánchez, José Miguel, 1996. "Grupos económicos y desarrollo: el caso de Chile," Sede de la CEPAL en Santiago (Estudios e Investigaciones) 30617, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
  19. Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  20. Erik Berglof & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 1999. "The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: Implications for Transition and Developing Countries," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 263, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  21. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H. P., 2000. "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 81-112.
  22. Hansmann, Henry, 1988. "Ownership of the Firm," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 267-304, Fall.
  23. Luigi Zingales, 1997. "Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 6309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  24. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," NBER Working Papers 5879, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. Laura T. Starks, 2000. "Corporate Governance And Institutional Investors: Implications For Latin America," Abante, Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 2(2), pages 161-181.
  26. Stulz, ReneM., 1988. "Managerial control of voting rights : Financing policies and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 25-54, January.
  27. Hayashi, Fumio, 1982. "Tobin's Marginal q and Average q: A Neoclassical Interpretation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 213-24, January.
  28. Fernando Lefort & Eduardo Walker, 2000. "Ownership And Capital Structure Of Chilean Conglomerates:Facts And Hypotheses For Governance," Abante, Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 3(1), pages 3-27.
  29. Barclay, Michael J. & Holderness, Clifford G., 1989. "Private benefits from control of public corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 371-395, December.
  30. Fernando Lefort & Eduardo Walker, 2000. "Corporate Governance: Challenges For Latin America," Abante, Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 2(2), pages 99-111.
  31. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, 04.
  32. McConnell, John J. & Servaes, Henri, 1990. "Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 595-612, October.
  33. Luigi Zingales, 1995. "What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(4), pages 1047-1073.
  34. Lucian Bebchuk & Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis, 1999. "Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and the Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Seperating Control from Cash Flow Rights," NBER Working Papers 6951, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  35. Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1991. "Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(1), pages 33-60.
  36. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov^, Simeon & Fan, Joseph P.H. & Lang, Larry H.P., 2000. "Expropriation of Minority Shareholders in East Asia," CEI Working Paper Series 2000-4, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  37. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May.
  38. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
  39. Zingales, Luigi, 1994. "The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(1), pages 125-48.
  40. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December.
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