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The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm : Implications for Transition and Developing Countries

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  • Erik BERGLÖF
  • Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN

Abstract

The rapidly growing literature studying the relationship between legal origin, investor protection, and finance has stimulated an important debate in academic circles. It has also generated a number of applied research projects and strong policy statements. This paper discusses the implications, in particular for developing and transition countries, from this literature. We conclude that its focus on the plight of small investors is too narrow when applied to these countries. We argue that this group is unlikely to play an important role in most developing and transition countries. External investors may still be crucial, but they are more likely to come in as strategic investors or creditors. The paper also proposes a broader paradigm including other stakeholders and mechanisms of governance in order to better understand the problems facing these countries and generate policy implications that compensate for the weaknesses of capital markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Erik BERGLÖF & Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN, 1999. "The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm : Implications for Transition and Developing Countries," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 9912, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
  • Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:9912
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate governance; corporate law; economic transition; economic development;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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