IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_782.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Softening Competition by Enhancing Entry: An Example from the Banking Industry

Author

Listed:
  • Jan Bouckaert
  • Hans Degryse

Abstract

We show that competing firms relax overall competition by lowering future barriers to entry. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclose borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to enter their market. Disclosure of borrower information increases an entrant’s second-period profits. This dampens competition for serving the first-period market

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Bouckaert & Hans Degryse, 2002. "Softening Competition by Enhancing Entry: An Example from the Banking Industry," CESifo Working Paper Series 782, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_782
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo_wp782.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pagano, Marco & Jappelli, Tullio, 1993. "Information Sharing in Credit Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(5), pages 1693-1718, December.
    2. Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, 2000. "Information Sharing in Credit Markets: A Survey," CSEF Working Papers 36, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    3. Paul Klemperer, 1995. "Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International Trade," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 62(4), pages 515-539.
    4. Tore Nilssen, 1992. "Two Kinds of Consumer Switching Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(4), pages 579-589, Winter.
    5. Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, 2000. "Information Sharing in Credit Markets: The European Experience," CSEF Working Papers 35, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    6. Thomas Gehrig & Rune Stenbacka, 2000. "Information Sharing in Banking: A Collusive Device?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1837, Econometric Society.
    7. von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 2004. "Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit contracts: the winner's curse," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 11-23, March.
    8. Jan Bouckaert & Hans Degryse, 2006. "Entry and Strategic Information Display in Credit Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(513), pages 702-720, July.
    9. Kallberg, Jarl G. & Udell, Gregory F., 2003. "The value of private sector business credit information sharing: The US case," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 449-469, March.
    10. Padilla, A. Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 2000. "Sharing default information as a borrower discipline device," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(10), pages 1951-1980, December.
    11. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1992. "Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1367-1400, September.
    12. Bester, Helmut, 1992. "Bertrand Equilibrium in a Differentiated Duopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(2), pages 433-448, May.
    13. Nilssen, Tore, 2000. "Consumer lock-in with asymmetric information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 641-666, May.
    14. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, April.
    15. Sharpe, Steven A, 1990. "Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1069-1087, September.
    16. Thomas Rønde, 2001. "Trade Secrets and Information Sharing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(3), pages 391-417, September.
    17. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
    18. Padilla, A Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 1997. "Endogenous Communication among Lenders and Entrepreneurial Incentives," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 10(1), pages 205-236.
    19. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Ezra Friedman & Robert Marquez, 1999. "Adverse Selection as a Barrier to Entry in the Banking Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(3), pages 515-534, Autumn.
    20. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Competition in the Changing World of Banking," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 17(4), pages 535-547.
    21. Klemperer, Paul D, 1987. "Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(388a), pages 99-117, Supplemen.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lorenzo Esposito, 2014. "Con Annibale alle porte. L'internazionalizzazione del sistema bancario e il caso italiano," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 67(266), pages 311-338.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jan Bouckaert & Hans Degryse, 2004. "Softening Competition by Inducing Switching in Credit Markets," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 27-52, March.
    2. Hainz, Christa, 2009. "Creditor passivity: The effects of bank competition and institutions on the strategic use of bankruptcy filings," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 582-596, December.
    3. Gehrig, Thomas & Stenbacka, Rune, 2007. "Information sharing and lending market competition with switching costs and poaching," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 77-99, January.
    4. Artashes Karapetyan & Bogdan Stacescu, 2014. "Information Sharing and Information Acquisition in Credit Markets," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 18(4), pages 1583-1615.
    5. Bertrand, Jérémie & Klein, Paul-Olivier, 2021. "Creditor information registries and relationship lending," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    6. Chu, Yinxiao & Li, Zhao & Wei, Jianxing & Wu, Weixing, 2022. "A tale of two markets: Labor market mobility and bank information sharing," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    7. Ylhäinen, Ilkka, 2017. "Life-cycle effects in small business finance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 176-196.
    8. Claeys, Sophie & Hainz, Christa, 2006. "Acquisition versus greenfield: the impact of the mode of foreign bank entry on information and bank lending rates," Working Paper Series 653, European Central Bank.
    9. Ralph De Haas & Matteo Millone & Jaap Bos, 2021. "Information Sharing in a Competitive Microcredit Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(7), pages 1677-1717, October.
    10. Liberti, José & Sturgess, Jason & Sutherland, Andrew, 2022. "How voluntary information sharing systems form: Evidence from a U.S. commercial credit bureau," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 827-849.
    11. Sutherland, Andrew, 2018. "Does credit reporting lead to a decline in relationship lending? Evidence from information sharing technology," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 123-141.
    12. J.-P. Niinimäki, 2022. "Relationship Lending and Switching Costs under Asymmetric Information about Bank Types," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 111-149, February.
    13. Jorge Ponce, 2010. "Intercambio de información en mercados de crédito: una revisión de la literatura," Documentos de trabajo 2010006, Banco Central del Uruguay.
    14. Christa N. Gibbs & Benedict Guttman-Kenney & Donghoon Lee & Scott Nelson & Wilbert Van der Klaauw & Jialan Wang, 2024. "Consumer Credit Reporting Data," Staff Reports 1114, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    15. Tassel, Eric Van, 2006. "Relationship lending under asymmetric information: A case of blocked entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 915-929, September.
    16. Behr, Patrick & Sonnekalb, Simon, 2012. "The effect of information sharing between lenders on access to credit, cost of credit, and loan performance – Evidence from a credit registry introduction," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(11), pages 3017-3032.
    17. He, Zhiguo & Huang, Jing & Zhou, Jidong, 2023. "Open banking: Credit market competition when borrowers own the data," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(2), pages 449-474.
    18. Degryse, Hans & Bouckaert, Jan, 2001. "Borrower Poaching and Information Display in Credit Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 2936, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Moshe Kim & Eirik Gaard Kristiansen & Bent Vale, 2012. "Life‐Cycle Patterns of Interest‐Rate Mark‐Ups in Small‐Firm Finance," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(2), pages 629-657, June.
    20. Hainz, Christa, 2004. "Quality of Institutions, Credit Markets and Bankruptcy," Discussion Papers in Economics 388, University of Munich, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    barriers to entry; asymmetric information; switching costs; banking competition.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_782. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Klaus Wohlrabe (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.