Entry and Strategic Information Display in Credit Markets
The Riegle-Neal Act in the US and the Economic and Monetary Union in Europe are recent initiatives to stimulate financial integration. These initiatives allow new entrants to "poach" the incumbents' clients by offering them attractive loan offers. We show that these deregulations may be insufficient since asymmetric information seriously hampers the integration of credit markets. Moreover, banks may strategically display some information hindering the scale of entry when asymmetric information is moderate. We also show that voluntary information sharing emerges only when asymmetric information is low.
|Date of creation:||01 Mar 2002|
|Publication status:||Published in The Economic Journal, 2006, vol. 116, pages 702-720|
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- Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, 2000. "Information Sharing in Credit Markets: The European Experience," CSEF Working Papers 35, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Banking Competition and European Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 373, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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