IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/fma/fmanag/eberhardt93.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Absolute Priority Rule Violations and Risk Incentives for Financially Distressed Firms

Author

Listed:
  • Allan C. Eberhart
  • Lemma W. Senbet

Abstract

In a June 12, 1990 Wall Street Journal article entitled "Warning Flag: When a Firm's Stocks and Bonds Diverge," the stocks and bonds of companies such as Pan Am and TWA were cited as being clearly mispriced. How, the article asked, could Pan Am's stock be trading at $2.50 per share when its senior debt was only worth 30 to 40 cents on the dollar? A managing director of a mutual fund was quoted as stating the prices were "totally ridiculous," and he further remarked, "Either the bond is too cheap or the stock is too high." The article noted that, "At least in theory, if a company's creditors' can't be fully paid, its stock, which ranks lower among its financial obligations, is next to worthless." In other words, the absolute priority rule (APR) will be followed. The APR states that creditors should be fully compensated before shareholders receive any portion of the bankrupt firm's value.

Suggested Citation

  • Allan C. Eberhart & Lemma W. Senbet, 1993. "Absolute Priority Rule Violations and Risk Incentives for Financially Distressed Firms," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 22(3), Fall.
  • Handle: RePEc:fma:fmanag:eberhardt93
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard & Agnès Fimayer & Jean-Daniel Guigou, 2007. "Financial versus Social Efficiency of Corporate Bankruptcy Law: the French Dilemma?," LSF Research Working Paper Series 07-02, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.
    2. Evans, Jocelyn, 2003. "The effect of discretionary actions on small firms' ability to survive Chapter 11 bankruptcy," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 115-128, January.
    3. Richardson, Grant & Taylor, Grantley & Lanis, Roman, 2015. "The impact of financial distress on corporate tax avoidance spanning the global financial crisis: Evidence from Australia," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 44-53.
    4. Esty, Benjamin C., 1998. "The impact of contingent liability on commercial bank risk taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 189-218, February.
    5. Chopard, Bertrand & Langlais, Eric, 2009. "Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d'entreprises
      [Strategic default and bankruptcy law]
      ," MPRA Paper 14366, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Nielsen, Carsten Krabbe, 2015. "The loan contract with costly state verification and subjective beliefs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 89-105.
    7. Blazy, Regis & Chopard, Bertrand, 2004. "Ex post efficiency of bankruptcy procedures: A general normative framework," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 447-471, December.
    8. Kenjiro Hori & Jorge Martin Ceron, 2016. "Removing Moral Hazard and Agency Costs in Banks: Beyond CoCo Bonds," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 1603, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
    9. Kenjiro Hori & Jorge Martin Cerón, 2017. "Contingent Convertible Bonds: Payoff Structures and Incentive Effects," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 1711, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
    10. Kenjiro Hori & Jorge Martin Ceron, 2014. "Agency Costs of Bail-in," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 1407, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
    11. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 2002. "Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 445-460, February.
    12. Richardson, Grant & Lanis, Roman & Taylor, Grantley, 2015. "Financial distress, outside directors and corporate tax aggressiveness spanning the global financial crisis: An empirical analysis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 112-129.
    13. Stanley D. Longhofer & Stephen R. Peters, 2000. "Protection for whom? creditor conflicts in bankruptcy," Working Paper 9909R, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    14. Longhofer, Stanley D., 1997. "Absolute Priority Rule Violations, Credit Rationing, and Efficiency," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 249-267, July.
    15. Gilles Recasens, 2003. "Faut-il adopter un système pro-créanciers de défaillances? Une revue de la littérature," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 6(1), pages 119-153, March.
    16. Philippe Frouté, 2007. "Theoretical foundation for a debtor friendly bankruptcy law in favour of creditors," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 201-214, December.
    17. Pyo, Unyong & Thompson, Howard E., 2007. "Bond prices in a debt priority structure with absolute priority rule deviation," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 113-134, March.
    18. Bertrand Chopard, 2005. "« Ex post » vs « Ex ante » : le cas de l’économie du droit de la faillite," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 81(4), pages 291-303.
    19. Lim, Terence & Lo, Andrew W. & Merton, Robert C. & Scholes, Myron S., 2006. "The Derivatives Sourcebook," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 1(5–6), pages 365-572, April.
    20. Eberhart, Allan C. & Sweeney, Richard J., 1996. "A note on noise in the market for bankrupt firms' securities," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 401-415, March.
    21. Stanley D. Longhofer, 1994. "Bankruptcy rules and debt contracting: on the relative efficiency of absolute priority, proportionate priority, and first-come, first-served rules," Working Paper 9415, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    22. Stanley D. Longhofer, 1997. "Absolute priority rule violations, credit rationing, and efficiency," Working Paper 9710, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fma:fmanag:eberhardt93. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Courtney Connors). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/fmaaaea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.