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What drives bank competition? Some international evidence


  • Stijn Claessens
  • Luc Laeven


Using bank-level data, we apply the Panzar and Rosse (1987) methodology to estimate the extent to which changes in input prices are reflected in revenues earned by specific banks in 50 countries' banking systems. We then relate this competitiveness measure to indicators of countries' banking system structures and regulatory regimes. We find systems with greater foreign bank entry and fewer entry and activity restrictions to be more competitive. We find no evidence that our competitiveness measure negatively relates to banking system concentration.

Suggested Citation

  • Stijn Claessens & Luc Laeven, 2004. "What drives bank competition? Some international evidence," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 563-592.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcpr:y:2004:p:563-592

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item


    Bank competition;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation


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