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Debt maturity structure in private firms: Does the family control matter?

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  • Díaz-Díaz, Nieves Lidia
  • García-Teruel, Pedro J.
  • Martínez-Solano, Pedro

Abstract

This research studies the effect of family control on the debt maturity structure of private firms. It uses a sample of unlisted Spanish firms for the period 2004–2013. Our results indicate that family firms get better access to long-term debt, even when exercising control by pyramid structures. However, the presence of a second largest family shareholder has a negative effect on debt maturity. Moreover, in line with previous studies, we find that firms use more long-term debt when they have fewer growth opportunities, higher asset maturity and are more leveraged.

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  • Díaz-Díaz, Nieves Lidia & García-Teruel, Pedro J. & Martínez-Solano, Pedro, 2016. "Debt maturity structure in private firms: Does the family control matter?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 393-411.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:37:y:2016:i:c:p:393-411
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.01.016
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    1. repec:eee:corfin:v:54:y:2019:i:c:p:26-46 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Orman, Cüneyt & Köksal, Bülent, 2017. "Debt maturity across firm types: Evidence from a major developing economy," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 169-199.
    3. repec:eee:pacfin:v:50:y:2018:i:c:p:1-15 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Debt maturity structure; Family firms; Controlling shareholders;

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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