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Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d'entreprises
[Strategic default and bankruptcy law]

Listed author(s):
  • Chopard, Bertrand
  • Langlais, Eric

We compare the influence of bankruptcy law on the risk of default and the rate of liquidation by banks. We show that it depends on whether it is pro-creditors or pro-debtors oriented, and on the intensity of competition between banks. Then , we analyse the various tools at the disposal of public authority in order to accomdate the transition from a pro-creditors regime to a pro-debtors one. In a sense, our results suggest that there may exist a kind of consistency between the aims assigned to law, the orientation of bankruptcy law and the level of competition in the banking system.

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File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14366/1/MPRA_paper_14366.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 14366.

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Date of creation: Mar 2009
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:14366
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