Economic analysis of the removal of illegal gains
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- Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, pages 45-76.
- Shavell, Steven, 1990. "Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 435-466, June.
- Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Mitchell Polinsky, A. & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1991. "A model of optimal fines for repeat offenders," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 291-306.
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- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, 2009.
The Journal of Legal Studies,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 21-59, January.
- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, "undated". "Negative Liability," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1030, American Law & Economics Association.
- Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2015.
"Status concerns as a motive for crime?,"
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- Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2013. "Status Concerns as a Motive for Crime?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4225, CESifo Group Munich.
- Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Status concerns as a motive for crime?," DICE Discussion Papers 93, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
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