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les criminels aiment-ils le risque ?
[Are criminals risk-seeking individulas ?]

  • Langlais, Eric

This papers studies three questions. What do we know about criminals 'preferences ? How should we represent such preferences ? What are the consequences for law enforcement policies ?

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14892/1/MPRA_paper_14892.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 14892.

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Date of creation: 27 Apr 2009
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:14892
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  14. Shavell, Steven, 1991. "Specific versus General Enforcement of Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 1088-1108, October.
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  19. Karni, Edi, 1983. "Risk Aversion for State-Dependent Utility Functions: Measurement and Applications," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 24(3), pages 637-47, October.
  20. Julien Pouget & Francis Kramarz & Denis Fougère, 2005. "L'analyse économétrique de la délinquance. Une synthèse de résultats récents," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 19(3), pages 3-55.
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  28. Michèle Cohen & Johanna Etner & Meglena Jeleva, 2008. "Dynamic Decision Making when Risk Perception Depends on Past Experience," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 64(2), pages 173-192, March.
  29. Cook, Philip J & Graham, Daniel A, 1977. "The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 91(1), pages 143-56, February.
  30. Roger Bowles & Michael Faure & Nuno Garoupa, 2008. "The scope of criminal law and criminal sanctions: An economic view and policy implications," Working Papers 2008-03, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  31. Tabbach Avraham D & Nussim Jacob, 2008. "Controlling Avoidance: Ex Ante Regulation Versus Ex Post Punishment," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 45-63, March.
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  33. Chateauneuf, Alain & Cohen, Michele, 1994. "Risk Seeking with Diminishing Marginal Utility in a Non-expected Utility Model," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 77-91, July.
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  39. Nell, Martin & Richter, Andreas, 2003. "The design of liability rules for highly risky activities--Is strict liability superior when risk allocation matters?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 31-47, March.
  40. Nicolas Jacquemet, 2006. "Micro-économie de la corruption," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 20(4), pages 117-159.
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