IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Microéconomie de la corruption

Listed author(s):
  • Nicolas Jacquemet


    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Du point de vue de l'analyse économique, la corruption tire ses spécificités de l'imbrication de deux contrats aux objectifs divergents. La corruption est définie comme un accord illégal, ou pacte de corruption, liant un agent à un corrupteur et destiné à organiser le détournement d'un pouvoir discrétionnaire. Ce pouvoir discrétionnaire est hérité, par l'agent, d'un contrat de délégation conclut avec un principal. A partir de cette définition "contractuelle" des situations de corruption, la revue de la littérature proposée ici articule les développements récents de l'analyse microéconomique de la corruption aux propriétés des relations bilatérales entre les joueurs.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00259459.

in new window

Date of creation: 2006
Publication status: Published in Revue Française d'Economie, Association Française d'Économie, 2006, XX (4), pp.118-159. 〈10.3406/rfeco.2006.1586〉
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00259459
DOI: 10.3406/rfeco.2006.1586
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server:
Contact details of provider: Web page:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

in new window

  1. Abbink, Klaus, 2004. "Staff rotation as an anti-corruption policy: an experimental study," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 887-906, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00259459. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.