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Corruption in environmental policy: the case of waste

Author

Listed:
  • Berardino Cesi

    (University of Rome “Tor Vergata”)

  • Alessio D’Amato

    (University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, and SEEDS)

  • Mariangela Zoli

    (University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, and SEEDS)

Abstract

This paper investigates interactions between waste and enforcement policies in the presence of a corruptible bureaucrat. We set up a repeated game obtained by an infinite repetition of a three stage game, where a firm producing illegal waste can bribe a bureaucrat in charge of monitoring its disposal choices. The bureaucrat may accept or not the bribe and chooses whether to hide illegal waste disposal to a national waste authority. We study conditions under which corruption can arise in equilibrium, and find that illegal disposal is larger under corruption, while, surprisingly, the bribe does not necessarily decrease with the punishment for detected corruption. Finally, our analysis suggests that increasing the interactions between the regulated firm and the bureaucrat increases illegal disposal via corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Berardino Cesi & Alessio D’Amato & Mariangela Zoli, 2019. "Corruption in environmental policy: the case of waste," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 36(1), pages 65-78, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:epolit:v:36:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s40888-017-0087-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s40888-017-0087-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

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    2. Compagnoni, Marco & Grazzi, Marco & Pieri, Fabio & Tomasi, Chiara, 2023. "Extended producer responsibility and trade flows in waste: The case of batteries," FEEM Working Papers 338789, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Waste management; Illegal disposal; Corruption; Enforcement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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