On Second-best Policing Effort against the Illegal Disposal of Recyclable Waste
In this paper, we construct a partial equilibrium model of a product that can be manufactured by using a recycled material as well as a virgin natural resource. In particular, we consider the possibility that a household may resort to the illicit disposal of its waste, such as midnight dumping, instead of discarding it properly. Our focus is on conducting a comparative static analysis on the second-best level of the government fs policing effort to counter illegal disposal. More specifically, we examine how the government should adjust the effort level in response to changes in the environmental damage cost of illegal disposal and exported waste.
|Date of creation:||May 2010|
|Date of revision:||May 2010|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 1-155 Uegahara Ichiban-cho, Nishinomiya, Hyogo 662-8501|
Web page: http://www-econ.kwansei.ac.jp/~econ/index_e.html
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Fullerton Don & Kinnaman Thomas C., 1995.
"Garbage, Recycling, and Illicit Burning or Dumping,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 78-91, July.
- Don Fullerton & Thomas C. Kinnaman, 1993. "Garbage, Recycling, and Illicit Burning or Dumping," NBER Working Papers 4374, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169-169.
- Takayoshi Shinkuma, 2003. "On the Second-best Policy of Household's Waste Recycling," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 24(1), pages 77-95, January.
- Higashida, Keisaku & Jinji, Naoto, 2006. "Strategic use of recycled content standards under international duopoly," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 242-257, March.
- Higashida, Keisaku & Jinji, Naoto, 2005. "Strategic Use of Recycled Content Standards under International Duopoly," Discussion Papers 2004-12, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
- Dinan Terry M., 1993. "Economic Efficiency Effects of Alternative Policies for Reducing Waste Disposal," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 242-256, November.
- Heyes, Anthony, 2000. "Implementing Environmental Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 107-129, March.
- Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sullivan, Arthur M., 1987. "Policy options for toxics disposal: Laissez-faire, subsidization, and enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 58-71, March.
- Palmer, Karen & Walls, Margaret, 1997. "Optimal policies for solid waste disposal Taxes, subsidies, and standards," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 193-205, August. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kgu:wpaper:56. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Toshihiro Okada)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.