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Optimal environmental policy for waste disposal and recycling when firms are not compliant

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  • Ino, Hiroaki

Abstract

We investigate a model that considers disposal and recycling activities after the consumption of products. In the field, the deposit-refund (D-R) policy has been considered as an ideal policy for internalizing disposal costs, which can result in the realization of the first-best policy. However, the possibility of firms' illegal disposal has been neglected. We introduce a monitoring cost to prevent firms from disposing of collected residuals illegally and induce the second-best D-R policy. We find that the relation between the monitoring problem for firms and the price of the recycling market brings about a variation in the optimal level of the refunds (which is typically smaller than the first-best level). Further, we investigate an alternative policy that requires producers to take-back residuals and show how this policy works equivalently to the second-best D-R policy by applying the theory of the tradable rights market.

Suggested Citation

  • Ino, Hiroaki, 2011. "Optimal environmental policy for waste disposal and recycling when firms are not compliant," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 290-308, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:62:y:2011:i:2:p:290-308
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    Cited by:

    1. Matsueda, Norimichi & Nagase, Yoko, 2012. "An economic analysis of the Packaging waste Recovery Note System in the UK," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 669-679.
    2. Walls, Margaret, 2011. "Deposit-Refund Systems in Practice and Theory," Discussion Papers dp-11-47, Resources For the Future.
    3. D’Amato, Alessio & Mazzanti, Massimiliano & Nicolli, Francesco, 2015. "Waste and organized crime in regional environments," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 185-201.
    4. Angelo Antoci & Simone Borghesi & Mauro Sodini, 2012. "ETS and Technological Innovation: A Random Matching Model," Working Papers 2012.79, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    5. Acuff, Kaylee & Kaffine, Daniel T., 2013. "Greenhouse gas emissions, waste and recycling policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 74-86.
    6. Mansikkasalo, Anna & Lundmark, Robert & Söderholm, Patrik, 2014. "Market behavior and policy in the recycled paper industry: A critical survey of price elasticity research," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 17-29.
    7. Hiroaki Ino & Norimichi Matsueda, 2014. "The Curse of Low-valued Recycling," Discussion Paper Series 123, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Oct 2014.
    8. Daniel T. Kaffine, 2014. "Scrap Prices, Waste, and Recycling Policy," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 90(1), pages 169-180.
    9. Honma, Satoshi, 2013. "Optimal policies for international recycling between developed and developing countries," MPRA Paper 43703, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Deposit Refund Monitoring Illegal waste disposal Take-back requirement Tradable rights;

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • Q21 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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