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Two Generalizations of a Deposit-Refund Systems

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  • Ann Wolverton
  • Don Fullerton

Abstract

This paper suggests two generalizations of the deposit-refund idea. In the first, we apply the idea not just to solid waste materials, but to any waste from production or consumption including wastes that may be solid, gaseous, or liquid. Using a simple general equilibrium model, we derive the optimal combination of a tax on a purchased commodity and subsidy to a clean' activity (such as emission abatement, recycling, or disposal in a sanitary landfill). This two-part instrument' is equivalent to a Pigovian tax on the dirty' activity (such as emissions, dumping, or litter). In the second generalization, we consider the case where government must use distorting taxes on labor and capital incomes. To help meet the revenue requirement, would the optimal deposit be raised and the refund reduced? We derive the second-best revenue-raising DRS or two-part instrument to answer that question.
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Suggested Citation

  • Ann Wolverton & Don Fullerton, 2000. "Two Generalizations of a Deposit-Refund Systems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 238-242, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:90:y:2000:i:2:p:238-242
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.90.2.238
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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.90.2.238
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fullerton, Don & Wolverton, Ann, 2005. "The two-part instrument in a second-best world," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1961-1975, September.
    2. A. Lans Bovenberg & Frederick van der Ploeg, 2002. "Environmental Policy, Public Finance and the Labour Market in a Second-Best World," Chapters, in: Lawrence H. Goulder (ed.), Environmental Policy Making in Economies with Prior Tax Distortions, chapter 6, pages 112-153, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Don Fullerton & Thomas C. Kinnaman, 2002. "Garbage, Recycling, and Illicit Burning or Dumping," Chapters, in: Don Fullerton & Thomas C. Kinnaman (ed.), The Economics of Household Garbage and Recycling Behavior, chapter 2, pages 49-62, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Fullerton, Don & Wolverton, Ann, 2005. "The two-part instrument in a second-best world," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1961-1975, September.
    5. Fullerton, Don, 1997. "Environmental Levies and Distortionary Taxes: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(1), pages 245-251, March.
    6. Walls, Margaret & Palmer, Karen, 2001. "Upstream Pollution, Downstream Waste Disposal, and the Design of Comprehensive Environmental Policies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 94-108, January.
    7. Lawrence Goulder, 1995. "Environmental taxation and the double dividend: A reader's guide," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 2(2), pages 157-183, August.
    8. Ronnie Schöb, 2002. "Environmental Taxes and Pre-Existing Distortions: The Normalization Trap," Chapters, in: Lawrence H. Goulder (ed.), Environmental Policy Making in Economies with Prior Tax Distortions, chapter 11, pages 184-193, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521322249, December.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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