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The Case for a Two-Part Instrument: Presumptive Tax and Environmental Subsidy

In: The Economics of Household Garbage and Recycling Behavior

Author

Listed:
  • Don Fullerton
  • Ann Wolverton

Abstract

The market for residential solid waste management and disposal has experienced dramatic changes over the past 20 years. This collection of outstanding published research examines these changes and thoroughly analyzes the strategies popularized by municipal governments over the past two decades.

Suggested Citation

  • Don Fullerton & Ann Wolverton, 2002. "The Case for a Two-Part Instrument: Presumptive Tax and Environmental Subsidy," Chapters, in: Don Fullerton & Thomas C. Kinnaman (ed.), The Economics of Household Garbage and Recycling Behavior, chapter 10, pages 175-200, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:2445_10
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    2. Hong, I-Hsuan & Lee, Yi-Ting & Chang, Pei-Yu, 2014. "Socially optimal and fund-balanced advanced recycling fees and subsidies in a competitive forward and reverse supply chain," Resources, Conservation & Recycling, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 75-85.
    3. Renan-Ulrich Goetz & Yolanda Martínez, 2013. "Nonpoint source pollution and two-part instruments," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 15(3), pages 237-258, July.
    4. Hilary Sigman, 2003. "Taxing Hazardous Waste: The U.S. Experience," Departmental Working Papers 200306, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    5. Sjak Smulders & Herman R. J. Vollebergh, 2001. "Green Taxes and Administrative Costs: The Case of Carbon Taxation," NBER Chapters, in: Behavioral and Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy, pages 91-130, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Hilary Sigman, 2003. "Targeting Lead in Solid Waste," Departmental Working Papers 200308, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    7. Arguedas, Carmen & van Soest, Daan P., 2009. "On reducing the windfall profits in environmental subsidy programs," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 192-205, September.
    8. Ruijs, Arjan & Vollebergh, Herman, 2013. "Lessons from 15 Years of Experience with the Dutch Tax Allowance for Energy Investments for Firms," Energy: Resources and Markets 151533, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    9. Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, 2002. "Environmental Controls, Scarcity Rents, and Pre-existing Distortions," Chapters, in: Lawrence H. Goulder (ed.), Environmental Policy Making in Economies with Prior Tax Distortions, chapter 26, pages 504-522, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Eskeland, Gunnar S., 2000. "Environmental protection and optimal taxation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2510, The World Bank.
    11. Bovenberg, A. Lans & Goulder, Lawrence H., 2002. "Environmental taxation and regulation," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 23, pages 1471-1545, Elsevier.
    12. Paul J. Ferraro & R. David Simpson, 2002. "The Cost-Effectiveness of Conservation Payments," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 78(3), pages 339-353.
    13. Walls, Margaret & Palmer, Karen, 2001. "Upstream Pollution, Downstream Waste Disposal, and the Design of Comprehensive Environmental Policies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 94-108, January.
    14. Don Fullerton & Andrew Leicester & Stephen Smith, 2008. "Environmental Taxes," NBER Working Papers 14197, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Lawrence H. Goulder & Ian W.H. Parry & Roberton C. Williams III & Dallas Burtraw, 2002. "The Cost-Effectiveness of Alternative Instruments for Environmental Protection in a Second-Best Setting," Chapters, in: Lawrence H. Goulder (ed.), Environmental Policy Making in Economies with Prior Tax Distortions, chapter 27, pages 523-554, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    16. Fullerton, Don & Wolverton, Ann, 2005. "The two-part instrument in a second-best world," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1961-1975, September.
    17. Fullerton, Don & West, Sarah E., 2002. "Can Taxes on Cars and on Gasoline Mimic an Unavailable Tax on Emissions?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 135-157, January.
    18. Vidar Christiansen & Stephen Smith, 2012. "Externality‐Correcting Taxes and Regulation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(2), pages 358-383, June.
    19. Calcott, Paul & Walls, Margaret, 2005. "Waste, recycling, and "Design for Environment": Roles for markets and policy instruments," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 287-305, November.
    20. Mohr, Robert D., 2002. "Technical Change, External Economies, and the Porter Hypothesis," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 158-168, January.
    21. Walls, Margaret, 2003. "The Role of Economics in Extended Producer Responsibility: Making Policy Choices and Setting Policy Goals," Discussion Papers 10855, Resources for the Future.
    22. Helfand, Gloria E. & Berck, Peter & Maull, Tim, 2003. "The theory of pollution policy," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 249-303, Elsevier.
    23. Lehmann, Paul, 2008. "Using a policy mix for pollution control: A review of economic literature," UFZ Discussion Papers 4/2008, Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research (UFZ), Division of Social Sciences (ÖKUS).

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • Q21 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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