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On reducing the windfall profits in environmental subsidy programs

  • Arguedas, Carmen
  • van Soest, Daan P.

Investment subsidies are widely used to induce adoption of new technologies that can lower the (marginal) cost of reducing emissions. To economize on these subsidies, governments would like to distinguish between firms that need to receive a subsidy to adopt a new technology, and firms that would adopt that technology even without subsidies. We show that policies consisting of a menu of emission taxes and investment subsidies can potentially induce firms to self-select.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ6-4W32KJ6-1/2/8037f537dd6a1709304528f787e6223a
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 58 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (September)
Pages: 192-205

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:58:y:2009:i:2:p:192-205
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

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