IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/8723.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Suggested Subsidies are Sub-optimal Unless Combined with an Output Tax

Author

Listed:
  • Don Fullerton
  • Robert D. Mohr

Abstract

Because of difficulties measuring pollution, many prior papers suggest a subsidy to some observable method of reducing pollution. We take three papers from the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management as examples, and we extend them to make an additional important point. In each case, we show that welfare under the suggested subsidy can be increased by the addition of an output tax. While the suggested subsidy reduces damage per unit of output, it also decreases the firm's cost of production and the equilibrium break-even price. It might therefore increase output -- unless combined with an output tax. Using one example, we show that a properly-constructed subsidy-tax combination is equivalent to a Pigovian tax. Another example is a computational model, used to show that the subsidy-tax combination can yield a welfare gain that is more than three times the gain from using the subsidy alone. The third example is a theoretical model, used to show that the subsidy alone increases production and thus could increase total pollution. An additional output tax offsets this increase in production.

Suggested Citation

  • Don Fullerton & Robert D. Mohr, 2002. "Suggested Subsidies are Sub-optimal Unless Combined with an Output Tax," NBER Working Papers 8723, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8723
    Note: PE EEE
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w8723.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. de Bovenberg, A Lans & Mooij, Ruud A, 1994. "Environmental Levies and Distortionary Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 1085-1089, September.
    2. Deacon Robert T., 1995. "Assessing the Relationship between Government Policy and Deforestation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-18, January.
    3. Sullivan, Arthur M., 1987. "Policy options for toxics disposal: Laissez-faire, subsidization, and enforcement," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 58-71, March.
    4. Fullerton Don & West Sarah E, 2010. "Tax and Subsidy Combinations for the Control of Car Pollution," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-33, February.
    5. Stavros G. Memtsoudis & Melanie C. Besculides & Lambros Zellos & Namrata Patil & Selwyn O. Rogers, "undated". "Trends in Lung Surgery: United States 1988 to 2002," Mathematica Policy Research Reports 60c42912474f4d08b93f8b06c, Mathematica Policy Research.
    6. Stranlund, John K., 1997. "Public Technological Aid to Support Compliance to Environmental Standards," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 228-239, November.
    7. Isaac Ehrlich, 1974. "Participation in Illegitimate Activities: An Economic Analysis," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 68-134, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. McGinty Matthew & de Vries Frans P, 2009. "Technology Diffusion, Product Differentiation and Environmental Subsidies," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-27, March.
    2. Daniel Jaqua & Daniel Schaffa, 2022. "The case for subsidizing harm: constrained and costly Pigouvian taxation with multiple externalities," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 29(2), pages 408-442, April.
    3. Cathrine Hagem & Michael Hoel & Thomas Sterner, 2020. "Refunding Emission Payments: Output-Based Versus Expenditure-Based Refunding," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 77(3), pages 641-667, November.
    4. David A Keiser & Joseph S Shapiro, 2019. "Consequences of the Clean Water Act and the Demand for Water Quality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 134(1), pages 349-396.
    5. Arguedas, Carmen & van Soest, Daan P., 2009. "On reducing the windfall profits in environmental subsidy programs," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 192-205, September.
    6. Chan, Nathan W. & Globus-Harris, Isla, 2023. "On consumer incentives for energy-efficient durables," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
    7. Holland, Stephen P., 2012. "Emissions taxes versus intensity standards: Second-best environmental policies with incomplete regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 375-387.
    8. Katrin Millock & Céline Nauges, 2006. "Ex Post Evaluation of an Earmarked Tax on Air Pollution," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 82(1), pages 68-84.
    9. Mazumder, Diya B., 2014. "Biofuel subsidies versus the gas tax: The carrot or the stick?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 361-374.
    10. David A. Keiser & Joseph K. Shapiro, 2018. "Consequences of the Clean Water Act and the Demand for Water Quality," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 17-wp571, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
    11. Stephen P. Holland, 2009. "Taxes and Trading versus Intensity Standards: Second-Best Environmental Policies with Incomplete Regulation (Leakage) or Market Power," NBER Working Papers 15262, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Maia David & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2010. "Pollution Abatement Subsidies and the Eco-Industry," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(2), pages 271-282, February.
    13. Hutchinson Emma & Kennedy Peter W & Martinez Cristina, 2010. "Subsidies for the Production of Cleaner Energy: When Do They Cause Emissions to Rise?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-11, April.
    14. Mohr, Robert D., 2006. "Environmental performance standards and the adoption of technology," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 238-248, June.
    15. Cathrine Hagem & Bjart Holtsmark & Thomas Sterner, 2012. "Mechanism design for refunding emissions payment," Discussion Papers 705, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    16. Borger, Bruno De, 2011. "Optimal congestion taxes in a time allocation model," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 79-95, January.
    17. Hagem, Cathrine & Hoel, Michael & Holtsmark, Bjart & Sterner, Thomas, 2015. "Refunding Emissions Payments," RFF Working Paper Series dp-15-05, Resources for the Future.
    18. Maia David & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2006. "Revisiting the Environmental Subsidy in the Presence of an Eco-Industry," Working Papers 2006/04, INRA, Economie Publique.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tatsuhito Kono & Yohei Mitsuhiro & Jun Yoshida, 2021. "Simultaneous optimization of multiple taxes on car use and tolls considering the marginal cost of public funds in Japan," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 72(2), pages 261-297, April.
    2. Santos, Georgina & Behrendt, Hannah & Maconi, Laura & Shirvani, Tara & Teytelboym, Alexander, 2010. "Part I: Externalities and economic policies in road transport," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 2-45.
    3. Lori Bennear & Robert Stavins, 2007. "Second-best theory and the use of multiple policy instruments," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 37(1), pages 111-129, May.
    4. Haradhan Kumar Mohajan, 2011. "Optimal Environmental Taxes Due to Health Effect," KASBIT Business Journals (KBJ), Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari Institute of Technology (KASBIT), vol. 4, pages 1-19, December.
    5. Yoshida, Jun & Kono, Tatsuhito, 2020. "Optimal Car-related Taxes and Pricing in Beijing Considering the Marginal Cost of Public Funds," MPRA Paper 101728, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Don Fullerton & Andrew Leicester & Stephen Smith, 2008. "Environmental Taxes," NBER Working Papers 14197, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Arunanondchai, Jutamas May, 2003. "Applied general equilibrium analysis of trade liberalisation on land-based sectors in Malaysia and Indonesia," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 25(9), pages 947-961, December.
    8. Bjertnæs, Geir H. & Tsygankova, Marina & Martinsen, Thomas, 2013. "Norwegian climate policy reforms in the presence of an international quota market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 147-158.
    9. Coxhead, Ian A. & Jayasuriya, Sisira, 2003. "Trade, Liberalization, Resource Degradation and Industrial Pollution in Developing Countries: An Integrated Analysis," Staff Papers 12691, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics.
    10. Yang Shen & Xiuwu Zhang, 2022. "Study on the Impact of Environmental Tax on Industrial Green Transformation," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(24), pages 1-18, December.
    11. Noel Perceval Assogba & Daowei Zhang, 2020. "An Economic Analysis of Tropical Forest Resource Conservation in a Protected Area," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(14), pages 1-12, July.
    12. MUNK, Knud J., 2011. "Optimal taxation in the presence of a congested public good and an application to transport policy," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2011057, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    13. Brita Bye & Karine Nyborg, 1999. "The Welfare Effects of Carbon Policies: Grandfathered Quotas versus Differentiated Taxes," Discussion Papers 261, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    14. Julie Anne Cronin & Don Fullerton & Steven Sexton, 2019. "Vertical and Horizontal Redistributions from a Carbon Tax and Rebate," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(S1), pages 169-208.
    15. Gaël Callonnec & Frédéric Reynès & Yasser Y. Tamsamani, 2012. "Une évaluation macroéconomique et sectorielle de la fiscalité carbone en France," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(1), pages 121-154.
    16. Slim Ben Youssef, 2010. "Adoption of a cleaner technology by a monopoly under incomplete information," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 734-743.
    17. Martinsson, Gustav & Sajtos, László & Strömberg, Per & Thomann, Christian, 2022. "Carbon Pricing and Firm-Level CO2 Abatement: Evidence from a Quarter of a Century-Long Panel," Misum Working Paper Series 2022-10, Stockholm School of Economics, Mistra Center for Sustainable Markets (Misum).
    18. Arguedas, Carmen & van Soest, Daan P., 2009. "On reducing the windfall profits in environmental subsidy programs," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 192-205, September.
    19. Wolfram F. Richter, 2007. "Taxing Human Capital Efficiently – The Double Dividend of Taxing Nonqualified Labour More Heavily Than Qualified Labour," Ruhr Economic Papers 0012, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    20. Hassan, Mahmoud & Oueslati, Walid & Rousselière, Damien, 2020. "Environmental taxes, reforms and economic growth: an empirical analysis of panel data," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 44(3).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8723. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.