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An Optimal Tax/Subsidy for Output and Pollution Control under Asymmetric Information in Oligopoly Markets

Author

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  • Kim, Jae-Cheol
  • Chang, Ki-Bok

Abstract

This paper constructs an optimal incentive tax/subsidy scheme in an oligopoly market with pollution, as a generalization of the Loeb-Magat scheme, which is nondiscriminatory and requires less information for implementation than the conventional ones. Some interesting properties of the scheme are discussed. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Kim, Jae-Cheol & Chang, Ki-Bok, 1993. "An Optimal Tax/Subsidy for Output and Pollution Control under Asymmetric Information in Oligopoly Markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 183-197, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:5:y:1993:i:2:p:183-97
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Lisandro Abrego & Carlo Perroni, 2002. "Investment subsidies and Time-Consistent Environmental Policy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 617-635, October.
    2. Prieger, James E. & Sanders, Nicholas J., 2012. "Verifiable and non-verifiable anonymous mechanisms for regulating a polluting monopolist," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 410-426.
    3. Corchón Díaz, Luis Carlos & Marcos, Félix, 2010. "Price regulation in oligopoly," UC3M Working papers. Economics we100101, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    4. Marcos, Félix & Corchón Díaz, Luis Carlos, 2011. "Price regulation in oligopolistic markets," UC3M Working papers. Economics 13443, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    5. repec:eee:jeeman:v:83:y:2017:i:c:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Lee, Sang-Ho, 1996. "An optional permit system for global pollution control," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 79-84, January.
    7. Antelo, Manel & Loureiro, Maria L., 2009. "Asymmetric information, signaling and environmental taxes in oligopoly," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(5), pages 1430-1440, March.
    8. Manel Antelo, 2012. "A Revenue-raising Government Taxing a Firm with Private Information," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 203(4), pages 57-86, December.
    9. Manel Antelo, 2011. "Output taxation by a revenue-raising government under signaling," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2011/03, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
    10. Halkos, George & Kitsou, Dimitra, 2014. "A weighted location differential tax method in environmental problems," MPRA Paper 59502, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Kim, Jae-Cheol & Lee, Sang-Ho, 1995. "An optimal regulation in an intertemporal oligopoly market: The Generalized Incremental Surplus Subsidy (GISS) scheme," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 225-249, September.
    12. Garcia, Arturo & Leal, Mariel & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2018. "A new irrelevance result in an endogenous timing with a consumer-friendly public firm," MPRA Paper 85648, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Boleslavsky, Raphael & Kelly, David L., 2014. "Dynamic regulation design without payments: The importance of timing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 169-180.
    14. Arguedas, Carmen & van Soest, Daan P., 2009. "On reducing the windfall profits in environmental subsidy programs," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 192-205, September.
    15. repec:spr:envpol:v:20:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10018-016-0179-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Lee, Sang-Ho & Kim, Jae-Cheol, 1995. "Oligopolistic incentives for pollution control with nonzero conjectures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 95-99, July.
    17. Berglann, Helge, 2012. "Implementing optimal taxes using tradable share permits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 402-409.

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