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Further notes on information, corruption, and optimal law enforcement

Author

Listed:
  • Nuno Garoupa

    ()

  • Mohamed Jellal

    ()

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Nuno Garoupa & Mohamed Jellal, 2007. "Further notes on information, corruption, and optimal law enforcement," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 59-69, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:23:y:2007:i:1:p:59-69
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-007-9002-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1995. "Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 145-159, January.
    2. Inderst, Roman, 2002. "Contract design and bargaining power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 171-176, January.
    3. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2001. "Corruption and optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-24, July.
    4. Marjit, Sugata & Shi, Heling, 1998. "On controlling crime with corrupt officials," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 163-172, January.
    5. Chang, Juin-jen & Lai, Ching-chong & Yang, C. C., 2000. "Casual police corruption and the economics of crime:: Further results," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 35-51, March.
    6. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
    7. Bowles, Roger & Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. "Casual police corruption and the economics of crime," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 75-87, March.
    8. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1997. "Collusion under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 875-912, July.
    9. Garoupa, Nuno & Klerman, Daniel, 2004. "Corruption and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 219-225, June.
    10. Frank Flatters & W. Macleod, 1995. "Administrative corruption and taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 2(3), pages 397-417, October.
    11. Besley, Timothy & McLaren, John, 1993. "Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 119-141, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:spr:etbull:v:5:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-017-0116-5 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Asongu, Simplice & Nwachukwu, Jacinta, 2017. "Building Knowledge Economies in Africa: A Survey of Policies and Strategies," MPRA Paper 81701, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Asongu, Simplice & Nguena, Christian, 2014. "Equitable and Sustainable Development of Foreign Land Acquisitions: what have we learnt on policy syndromes and implications?," MPRA Paper 56808, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Simplice Anutechia Asongu & Christian Lambert Nguena, 2014. "Equitable and sustainable development of foreign land acquisitions: Lessons, Policies and Implications," AAYE Policy Research Working Paper Series 14_013, Association of African Young Economists, revised Aug 2014.
    5. repec:spr:jknowl:v:8:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s13132-015-0321-0 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Grajzl, Peter & Baniak, Andrzej, 2018. "Private enforcement, corruption, and antitrust design," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 284-307.
    7. Grajzl, Peter & Baniak, Andrzej, 2009. "Industry self-regulation, subversion of public institutions, and social control of torts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 360-374, December.
    8. Simplice A. Asongu, 2017. "Knowledge Economy Gaps, Policy Syndromes, and Catch-Up Strategies: Fresh South Korean Lessons to Africa," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 8(1), pages 211-253, March.
    9. Simplice A. Asongu, 2017. "The Comparative Economics of Knowledge Economy in Africa: Policy Benchmarks, Syndromes, and Implications," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 8(2), pages 596-637, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fine; Probability of detection and punishment; Corruption; Information; K4;

    JEL classification:

    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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