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Contract design and bargaining power

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  • Inderst, Roman

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  • Inderst, Roman, 2002. "Contract design and bargaining power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 171-176, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:74:y:2002:i:2:p:171-176
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    1. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1989. "Inflexible Rules in Incentive Problems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 69-84, March.
    2. Stole, Lars A, 1995. "Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(4), pages 529-562, Winter.
    3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1990. "Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(4), pages 597-625.
    4. Srinagesh, Padmanabhan & Bradburd, Ralph M, 1989. "Quality Distortion by a Discriminating Monopolist," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 96-105, March.
    5. Ching-To Albert Ma, 1994. "Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, pages 109-129.
    6. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
    7. Jullien, Bruno, 2000. "Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 1-47, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fernandes, Gláucia & Gomes, Leonardo & Vasconcelos, Gabriel & Brandão, Luiz, 2016. "Mitigating wind exposure with zero-cost collar insurance," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 336-346.
    2. Yao, Zhiyong, 2012. "Bargaining over incentive contracts," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 98-106.
    3. Palermo, Alberto, 2016. "Hold-up in vertical hierarchies with adverse selection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 148(C), pages 91-95.
    4. Roland Kirstein & Birgit Will, 2006. "Efficient compensation for employees' inventions," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, pages 129-148.
    5. Nuno Garoupa & Mohamed Jellal, 2007. "Further notes on information, corruption, and optimal law enforcement," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 59-69, February.
    6. Sheu, Jiuh-Biing & Gao, Xiao-Qin, 2014. "Alliance or no alliance—Bargaining power in competing reverse supply chains," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 233(2), pages 313-325.
    7. Gick, Wolfgang, 2015. "A Theory of Delegated Contracting," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113069, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Arjen van Witteloostuijn & Thijs Jansen & Arie van Lier, 2007. "Bargaining over managerial contracts in delegation games: managerial power, contract disclosure and cartel behavior," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(8), pages 897-904.
    9. Will, Birgit E. & Kirstein, Roland, 2002. "Efficient Compensation for Employees' Inventions: An Economic Analysis of a Legal Reform in Germany," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2002-08, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    10. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.

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