Hold-up in vertical hierarchies with adverse selection
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie Villeval, 2011.
"Hidden information, bargaining power, and efficiency: an experiment,"
Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(2), pages 133-159, May.
- Gary Charness & Marie Claire Villeval & Antonio Cabrales, 2009. "Hidden Information, Bargaining Power and Efficiency: An Experiment," Working Papers 2009-08, FEDEA.
- Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Hidden Information, Bargaining Power, And Efficiency: An Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00614472, HAL.
- Inderst, Roman, 2002. "Contract design and bargaining power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 171-176, January.
- Yao, Zhiyong, 2012. "Bargaining over incentive contracts," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 98-106.
- Bental, Benjamin & Demougin, Dominique, 2010. "Declining labor shares and bargaining power: An institutional explanation," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 443-456, March.
- Roman Inderst, 2003. "Alternating-offer bargaining over menus under incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(2), pages 419-429, September.
- Marina Halac, 2015. "Investing in a relationship," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(1), pages 165-185, March.
- Deffains, Bruno & Demougin, Dominique, 2008. "Legal competition, political process and irreversible investment decisions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 615-627, September.
More about this item
KeywordsBargaining; Adverse selection; Hold-up;
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:148:y:2016:i:c:p:91-95. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.