Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study
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- Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2013. "Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(4), pages 1516-1544.
- Schmitz, Patrick W. & Hoppe-Fischer, Eva, 2013. "Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study," CEPR Discussion Papers 9287, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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More about this item
Keywords
Agency theory; Adverse selection; Information gathering; Ultimatum game; Social preferences; Experiment;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBE-2013-02-16 (Cognitive and Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2013-02-16 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2013-02-16 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2013-02-16 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
Statistics
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