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Revisiting Kindness and Confusion in Public Goods Experiments

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  • Daniel Houser
  • Robert Kurzban

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Houser & Robert Kurzban, 2002. "Revisiting Kindness and Confusion in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1062-1069, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:92:y:2002:i:4:p:1062-1069
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/00028280260344605
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Why free ride? : Strategies and learning in public goods experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 291-304, December.
    2. Andereoni, J., 1988. "Why Free Ride? Strategies And Learning In Public Goods Experiments," Working papers 375, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
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