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Peer effects in public contributions: theory and experimental evidence

  • Coralio Ballester

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of Alicante.)

  • Pablo Brañas-Garza

    ()

    (Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.)

  • María Paz Espinosa

    ()

    (Universidad del País Vasco)

This paper analyzes the impact of social integration on cooperative behavior. We show that if the social network shows assortative mixing then conditional cooperation is an equilibrium strategy for altruistic subjects with a high degree of social integration.We provide experimental evidence on the relationship between individuals’ position in a social network and their contributions in a public good game.

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File URL: http://www.ugr.es/~teoriahe/RePEc/gra/wpaper/thepapers08_04.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. in its series ThE Papers with number 08/04.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 27 Jun 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:gra:wpaper:08/04
Contact details of provider: Postal: Campus Universitario de Cartuja
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Fax: (34)958249995
Web page: http://www.ugr.es/local/teoriahe
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  1. Fischbacher, Urs & Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001. "Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 397-404, June.
  2. Bramoulle, Yann & Kranton, Rachel, 2007. "Public goods in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 478-494, July.
  3. Andereoni, J., 1988. "Why Free Ride? Strategies And Learning In Public Goods Experiments," Working papers 375, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  4. Coralio Ballester & Antoni Calvo-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2005. "Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: the Key Player," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000586, www.najecon.org.
  5. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., . "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Chapters in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  6. Coralio Ballester & Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2010. "Delinquent Networks," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(1), pages 34-61, 03.
  7. Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2003. "Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior," Working Papers 52, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  8. Luis G. Gonzalez & Vittoria Levati & Graciela Gonzalez-Farias, 2005. "Logit estimation of conditional cooperation in a repeated public goods experiment," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-05, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  9. Pablo Brañas-Garza & María Paz Espinosa, 2008. "Unraveling Public Good Games," ThE Papers 08/01, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
  10. repec:att:wimass:9309 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Stephen Leider & Markus M. Möbius & Tanya Rosenblat & Quoc-Anh Do, 2007. "How much is a friend worth?: directed altruism and enforced reciprocity in social networks," Working Papers 07-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
  12. Jennifer Zelmer, 2003. "Linear Public Goods Experiments: A Meta-Analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 299-310, November.
  13. Keser, Claudia & van Winden, Frans, 2000. " Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(1), pages 23-39, March.
  14. Ananish Chaudhuri & Tirnud Paichayontvijit, 2006. "Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to a public good," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(8), pages 1-14.
  15. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Why free ride? : Strategies and learning in public goods experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 291-304, December.
  16. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2006:i:8:p:1-14 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Brandts, Jordi & Schram, Arthur, 2001. "Cooperation and noise in public goods experiments: applying the contribution function approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 399-427, February.
  18. Andreoni, James, 1995. "Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 891-904, September.
  19. Anderson, Simon P. & Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 1998. "A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 297-323, November.
  20. Daniel Houser & Robert Kurzban, 2002. "Revisiting Kindness and Confusion in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1062-1069, September.
  21. Stephen Leider & Markus M. Möbius & Tanya Rosenblat & Quoc-Anh Do, 2007. "Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks: How Much is A Friend Worth?," NBER Working Papers 13135, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Maria Vittoria Levati, . "Explaining Private Provision of Public Goods by Conditional Cooperation - An Evoltuionary Approach -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-44, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  23. Rachel T. A. Croson, 2007. "Theories Of Commitment, Altruism And Reciprocity: Evidence From Linear Public Goods Games," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(2), pages 199-216, 04.
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